Perhaps you are thinking of General der Flieger Walter Wever, the first chief of staff of the OKL? (from wiki)
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He became the Commander of the RLM (Reichsluftfahrtministerium/Reich Aviation Ministry), and later became Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, a post he held up until his death. Wever was a firm supporter of the Strategic bomber and recognised its importance as early as 1934. He supported the aviation companies like Junkers and Dornier, in their respective projects to produce the Ju 89 and Dornier Do 19 Ural Bomber. However, after his death his successors Albert Kesselring, Ernst Udet and Hans Jeschonnek favoured smaller aircraft as they did not expend as much material and manpower. They were proponents of the dive-bomber (Junkers Ju 87) and the doctrine of close support and destruction of the opposing airforces on the 'battle-ground' rather than through attacking enemy industry. As a result, high-speed medium-bombers like Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88 were developed, with much initial success. On 6 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden, to give a lecture at the Luftkriegsakademie. On his return journey the Heinkel He 70 that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflighted checks, and the aileron gust locks were not removed. The aircraft was airborne when the wing dipped, the Heinkel stalled, and exploded in flames killing Wever and his engineer.
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With the death of the far-sighted General Wever, Germany lost any chance of being a player in the strategic bomber concept. The Führer was not a long-term planner, and didn't see the need for a fleet of large four-engined bombers, preferring to have two, three or four smaller bombers that could be used in the tactical support role of the Heer. By the time Germany saw the need, and could really use, a four-engined bomber, it was too late. Short term gain, by having huge numbers of single and twin engined light and medium bombers, meant that any thoughts of a strategic arm was lost. When the rush was on for a new design for a strategic bomber, Germany needed fighters, fighters and more fighters, not bombers. Even if they had the material to construct a fleet of strategic bombers later in the war, they certainly didn't have the fuel to operate them, or the crew to fly them.