[Stephan H.]

As a suggestion, I would compare the various effects of Soviet Operational performance between the "Vistual-Oder" Operation and the "Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation."

You will find that the Soviets used the same tactics and operational principles but both operations had very different experiences.

Contrary to popular history that assumes that the Red Army had somehow become this professional, experienced, well trained, and equipped military organization that proved more than capable of handling the Whermacht.

The truth is a bit different. The Soviet's were experience a manpower crisis by 1945. Red Army divisions were now down to 2,000-4,000 men. It was suffering both morale and discipline problems. Political Commissars now instituted an old Imperial Army practice of carrying Banners into battle during the Berlin Operation. The Red Army was well equipped and armed, though it suffered in certain modern military gear like wireless radio communications.

Operationally, the Red Army practiced no combined-arms training between infantry and armor formations that caused significant losses. In addition, Soviet Commanders demonstrated an operational inflexibility that was capitalized on by German commanders (like Heinrici during the battle for the Seelow Heights).

What made the January 1945 offensive so succesful vs the April offensive was how the Whermacht defended. The German Army defended the main line, not in depth, and had no operational reserves--typical for the German Army in the East after 1943. In April, with Hitler's permission, Army Group Vistula established the first fixed defensive line in-depth on the Eastern Front, with armor reserves. Despite the fact that the Wehrmacht was outnumbered in every category of manpower and equipment, the Soviet's suffered losses that were not seen since the German invasion of the Soviet in Union in 1941. The Soviets lost more tanks, aircraft and equipment than they did at Kursk in 1943 when they faced a better equiped enemy.

I detail all this in [u]Bloody Streets[u]. When I started my research, I didn't think I'd find these conclusions, but that's where my research and analysis took me. BTW, these conclusions are drawn from a varity of sources, and surprisingly many Soviet commanders and Soviet Official Histories themselves.

Stephan