[Brett]

I have argued before that only if the Japanese had not
attacked Pearl Harbor (or other US targets in a 1st strike)
did they have any chance at all. They could have just
seized the oil & other resources of SE Asia which was
their whole reason for going to war (attacks on the US
was solely to eliminate the threat of US interference in
that goal).

Had that been the case, it would have been very hard to get
the US in a war perceived to be for British, Fr. & Dutch
colonies. Even if the US had entered, a bloodbath such
as Tarawa may very well have force the US to make
a negotiated peace.

As the war went historically, I entirely agree with what
was said by others. US production was just too much for
Japan to withstand.

IMO Japan’s biggest tactical blunders were naval.
There were at least 4 times when the IJN could have
inflicted catastrophic reversals on the Allies. Again,
I don’t think it would have changed the final outcome.

The biggest danger is that US public opinion would
have forced a major redeployment to the Pacific,
which may very well have meant a Soviet and/or
German dominated Europe.

The 4:

Pearl Harbor:

Had the IJN task force made more than the 2
historical strikes, they could have knocked out
oil farms & repair facilities (possibly with battleship
bombardment). This could have forced the USN
to abandon Hawaii and be based on the West
Coast.

Midway:

The IJN force was scattered hither and yon. They
had 8 carriers, but only 4 engaged in battle. Their
battleships were between Midway & the Aleutians.

This was in the vain hope that the USN would rush
to the Aleutians upon the IJN 1st attacks of the battle
there, then blunder on the IJN battleship force upon
speeding back to Midway after Japan attacked there.

IMO a far better tactic would have massed all their
forces mostly in 1 group, with deadly battleship AA.
This main force would strictly concentrate on
sinking Allied warships.

Another battleship group (with perhaps 1 carrier
to provide air defense) would have made a high
speed dash to bombard Midway & knock out
the airfield.

This would have prevented a major contributing
factor to Japan’s defeat -- their carriers fatal
delay in switching between armaments for
land targets to naval targets.

The IJN may very well have inflicted a crippling
defeat on the USN, conquered Midway & left
the rest of Hawaii wide open to invasion.


Savo Island:

In early Aug. ’42, the IJN destroys the covering force for
the Guadalcanal invasion. If they had continued, they could
have sunk most of the merchant ships supplying the marines.
It could very well have meant another Baatan.


Battle off Samar:

(Oct. ’44) An IJN force with battleships surprises a USN
task force consisting only of destroyers & “jeep” carriers
(converted merchant ships with a small airplane complement
& top speeds ~ 15 knots vs. warships with top speed ~ 30 knots).
The USN task force fought back heroically & drove the IJN
force off.

But Morrison, the USN official historian, wrote that
with better tactics, the IJN force should have won
& fallen on the transports off Leyte with devastating
results.


The only land victories that Japan with better tactics
might have won after their initial ones was Port Moresby,
New Guinea or Guadalcanal. (They very well could
have won other battles such as Iwo Jima or Tarawa
with some luck or less fortitude from their foes. But
at least from my understanding, it was not due to
major tactical blunders -- for instance Banzai charges
were after they already lost).

At Port Moresby and Guadalcanal, I have read that
if they had concentrated on one or the other, instead
of splitting their forces between them, they might
have won. This to me is somewhat dubious since if
they concentrated on one, the Allies could have too.

But perhaps with some deception, they could have
pulled off another Malay in New Guinea, or Bataan
on Guadalcanal. Again, I don’t think this would
have affected the final outcome of the Pacific war,
but it might have influenced the European result.