[temujin77]

"pacific: yamamoto was the sanest commander the japanese had, a man who could possibly have convinced the leadership to end the war earlier than it did, yet we went out of our way to assasinate him, was this the correct move?"

A big generalization of Yamamoto, my friend.

Despite my utmost respect for the admiral, Yamamoto was not the superman that everyone made him out to be. First of all, he was not the only one who argued against war; in fact, there was a whole faction who bitterly opposed it. Yamamoto was merely one of them. But getting back on topic, if there was one thing why the US should not had intercepted his transport, it was not because of his anti-war stance before the war, but it was because by then Yamamoto's endless pursuit of a Mahanian victory had already led Japan on a downward spiral. Look at his strategy throughout the conflict at the Solomons Islands. Again and again he could have concentrated his forces to deal a critical blow against the US Navy and probably would set back the eventual Allied victory in the Pacific by months if not years, but he refused to do so. Instead, he sent in forces in small quantities, and ended up frittering away Japanese naval strength. He also suffered from overplanning, making his tactical plans overly complicated and difficult to execute; such a complex plan worked in his favor during the opening stages of the Pacific War, but he should had known luck had something to do with it as well. Finally, Yamamoto must also be partially blamed, at least, for Japan's eventual unpreparedness to supply the military with adequate aircraft and trained pilots.

Yamamoto's mistakes toward 1943 was the reason why the American might re-think the argument for the interception, not because he was "sane". "Yamamoto might have come to be seen, even by the Americans, as an asset to their cause", said historian Dan van der Vat.