B-29s Firebombing Japan

[Troy Tempest]

In the Pacific, General Haywood Hansen's XXI Bomber Command finally start their campaign against Japan on 14.11.1944. Unfortunately, their high altitude precision bombing tactics produced little results, mainly due to the unplanned encounter with powerful jet streams. Their first target, the Nakajima factory of Musashino, received minimal damage at best. The XXI Bomber Command continued to fine-tune their bombing techniques during December and January, however, their efforts were plagued by the jet stream, a high velocity wind that flows above Japan that's well known by the host country, but little studied in the United States. Jet streams operated at nearly the same altitude the B-29s flew, usually between 27,000 to 33,000 feet. This pushed the fragile airframe as fast as 450 mph in ground speed and taxing the already unrefined engines, causing fires, multiple breakdowns and consuming too much fuel. What's worse, despite multiple raids at high cost, their number one target, the Nakajima aircraft factory at Musashino-tama, just northwest of Tokyo, received minimal damage when the bombs scattered due to the fast jet stream winds.

On 3.1.1945, General Hansen sent his B-29s on their first firebombing mission against Nagoya, using the new M69 bombs, but he returned to conventional bombing over Musashino-tama again due to its high priority. Their efforts were beginning to improve a little but by then it was too late for General Hansen to prove his efforts. Washington sent General Curtis LeMay to replace him. On 20.1.1945, General LeMay took over the XXI Bomber Command. At first he followed General Hansen's high altitude conventional bombing campaign with minimal results. The crew morale was at an all time low. Then in desperation, he took note from General Chennault's design of firebombing at low altitude and ordered his gun crews to remove all guns, except for the tail defence, to increase the bomb load. The crews were shocked to hear about the new tactic, and LeMay took the responsibility of not informing USSAAF to perform this new daring night raid. At dusk of 9.3.1945m at least 334 B-29 bombers took off from Tinian, Saipan and Guam. Just before midnight, the pathfinders dropped their load of M47 napalm bombs over Tokyo, creating a target marking that looked like a giant "X" in flames for the rest of the bombers to follow.

They dropped mostly M69 incendiary bombs, which exploded at around 2000 feet altitude, spraying burning oil over the city. As the man-made firestorm reached thousands of degrees fahrenheit, some tried to escape toward the nearby Sumida river, but were either boiled alive or, if lucky, trampled to death. Those who escaped to air raid shelters were either killed by fire or suffocated to death when the firestorm sucked out all the oxygen. The nearby Kawaguchi river caught fire when the industrial pollution in the water ignited. The holocaust killed 83,793 and injured 40,918 mostly civilians by first official Japanese account. The worst mass killing day of the war. The Americans didn't escape unscathed, 40 Japanese fighters, none equipped for night fighting, managed to get airborne during the chaos. With anti-aircraft guns blazing, they managed to damage 42 bombers. 14 B-29s were lost, but air-sea rescue saved 5 crews. 16 square miles of Tokyo were completely destroyed. General LeMay considered the new tactic successful and ordered more targets to be torched.

On the morning of 10.3, citizens near Tokyo thought they were seeing an unusually bright sunrise, what they found in horror is that they had just witnessed the worst single-day holocaust in human history. Not even the upcoming atomic bombing would have a higher one-day body count. In the Meiji-za theatre dead bodies stacked up eight feet high. In air raid shelters many died in upright position, squeezed by packed humans with no air to breathe. But for the Japanese, once the shock wore off, they were better prepared to face further raids. A night later, on 11/12.3.1945, 285 bombers were sent to Nagoya. Losing one bomber they burned 2 square miles of the city. Two nights later, 8 square miles of Osaka were torched. The city of Kobe was hit three nights after that, with 3 square miles being engulfed. With the total loss of 20 B-29s, LeMay's bombers killed 120,000 civilians in less than two weeks. The B-29 Superfortress, designed as a high altitude precision bomber for military targets, turned out to be better at firebombing at low altitude over the cities. But the military targets were not left out.

While LeMay waited for his restock of incendiary bombs, he was ordered to use his B-29s to support the Okinawa inavsion during April. This included striking the kamikaze airbases in Kyushu. On 5.5.1945 they tried to bomb from high altitude the naval base of Kure with minimal results, causing them to revert back to low-level firebombing at Nagoya again on 14.5. On 23.5 Tokyo was hit, but the casualties started to mount when 43 B-29s were lost during those two raids, including the famous one nicknamed "Eddie Allen" on the morning of 26.5. LeMay's bombers destroyed 56 square miles by the end of the month but with heavier losses, he changed tactics back to high-altitude daylight bombings.

Hiroshima was only two months away.

[Geek44]

Utterly appalling eh?
I once noted these incidents to my mother who was an avid reader. She had thought that the bombing during the 'Blitz' in England had been the worst ever seen. IIRC 'only' 30,000 killed in the Blitz.
As an aside, I think it shows an incredible tenacity, will or just plain fear of authority that the Japanese were willing to keep going after such a raid. Thanks for the info TT. Fascinating stuff.

[Aussie Dave]

Even those raids no matter how horrific they were, still didn't damper the resolve of the Japanese military and its leaders to keep on fighting.

It eventually took atomic bombs to dropped on two of their cities to force a surrender, which actually saved a lot more lives on both sides if an invasion of Japan had been needed to end the war.

War ain't pretty.


Cheers,
Dave

[cyberia]

I don't think the bombing of civilian populations dampened any resolves in the Second World War. If anything just the opposite.

Rotterdam inspired the post-cease fire operations of the Dutch underground. The Blitz make the Brits tougher and the bombing of German civilians only made them fight harder.

Industrial targets paid off in the disruption of wartime production. Civilian targets yielded little more than a substantial rise in death tolls.

[Geek44]

Agree whole heartedly cyberia...in fact it's pretty well documented. Y'know I've often wondered about Hitler's apparent blind spot for the value of industrial disruption through bombing. Sure there was the rather silly (but cool looking) Heinkel 177 Greif but no really heavy bombers of the Lancaster, Halifax, Stirling, B-17, B-24 ilk. I guess it's just one of the edges in the Allies favour if you will.
Peace.

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by Geek44

Agree whole heartedly cyberia...in fact it's pretty well documented. Y'know I've often wondered about Hitler's apparent blind spot for the value of industrial disruption through bombing. Sure there was the rather silly (but cool looking) Heinkel 177 Greif but no really heavy bombers of the Lancaster, Halifax, Stirling, B-17, B-24 ilk. I guess it's just one of the edges in the Allies favour if you will.
Peace.

For the life of me, Geek, I can't recall the name of the heavy bomber, but there was one in the design stages early in the war his general staff at the time was trying to get off the ground. (pun intended) But Hitler refused.

Many believe because his ground offences were going so well and his current Luftwaffe inventory could easily handle what he had thus far been up against, he felt there was no need for further development for heavy bombers.
He did not consider England would one day become a massive airfield for the just the type of aircraft he was lacking.

Not so much a blind spot, as lack of foresight.

[Troy Tempest]

Perhaps you are thinking of General der Flieger Walter Wever, the first chief of staff of the OKL? (from wiki)

He became the Commander of the RLM (Reichsluftfahrtministerium/Reich Aviation Ministry), and later became Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, a post he held up until his death. Wever was a firm supporter of the Strategic bomber and recognised its importance as early as 1934. He supported the aviation companies like Junkers and Dornier, in their respective projects to produce the Ju 89 and Dornier Do 19 Ural Bomber. However, after his death his successors Albert Kesselring, Ernst Udet and Hans Jeschonnek favoured smaller aircraft as they did not expend as much material and manpower. They were proponents of the dive-bomber (Junkers Ju 87) and the doctrine of close support and destruction of the opposing airforces on the 'battle-ground' rather than through attacking enemy industry. As a result, high-speed medium-bombers like Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88 were developed, with much initial success. On 6 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden, to give a lecture at the Luftkriegsakademie. On his return journey the Heinkel He 70 that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflighted checks, and the aileron gust locks were not removed. The aircraft was airborne when the wing dipped, the Heinkel stalled, and exploded in flames killing Wever and his engineer.

With the death of the far-sighted General Wever, Germany lost any chance of being a player in the strategic bomber concept. The Führer was not a long-term planner, and didn't see the need for a fleet of large four-engined bombers, preferring to have two, three or four smaller bombers that could be used in the tactical support role of the Heer. By the time Germany saw the need, and could really use, a four-engined bomber, it was too late. Short term gain, by having huge numbers of single and twin engined light and medium bombers, meant that any thoughts of a strategic arm was lost. When the rush was on for a new design for a strategic bomber, Germany needed fighters, fighters and more fighters, not bombers. Even if they had the material to construct a fleet of strategic bombers later in the war, they certainly didn't have the fuel to operate them, or the crew to fly them.

[Aussie Dave]

Originally Posted by cyberia

For the life of me, Geek, I can't recall the name of the heavy bomber, but there was one in the design stages early in the war his general staff at the time was trying to get off the ground. (pun intended) But Hitler refused.

Many believe because his ground offences were going so well and his current Luftwaffe inventory could easily handle what he had thus far been up against, he felt there was no need for further development for heavy bombers.
He did not consider England would one day become a massive airfield for the just the type of aircraft he was lacking.

Not so much a blind spot, as lack of foresight.

The Germans did have several prototype heavy bombers, one being the Me-264 'Amerika'.






Also the Junkers Ju 390 was another heavy bomber that never made it past the prototype stage and into a production model.



Cheers,
Dave

[cyberia]

Thanks AD and Troy, I needed that jog of memory. It was the Ural Bomber I was thinking of initially, as the earliest pitch for a long range bomber. The Amerika Bomber, I believe, came later.

There was also the innovated "flying wing" design of the Horton brothers.

[Brett]

Originally Posted by Geek44

Agree whole heartedly cyberia...in fact it's pretty well documented. Y'know I've often wondered about Hitler's apparent blind spot for the value of industrial disruption through bombing. Sure there was the rather silly (but cool looking) Heinkel 177 Greif but no really heavy bombers of the Lancaster, Halifax, Stirling, B-17, B-24 ilk. I guess it's just one of the edges in the Allies favour if you will.
Peace.

I don't know if I agree with this. Sure strategic bombing caused a lot
of problems for the Axis -- but the Allies devoted an enormous amount
of resources to their heavy bombers -- resources that could have been
used in perhaps better ways.

At the very least, the tactics used in Allied Strategic bombing left
a lot to be desired, IMO. I believe even the USAF official history
admits that unescorted bombing over Germany was a serious blunder.
I understand that B-17/B-24 had a smaller bomb load than British bombers
because they had more defensive firepower. They probably should
have been replaced with escorted Lancasters.

In the Pacific I think I read that 4% of air sorties caused 16% of
Japanese merchant ship sinkings. Instead of relying on submarines
to wipe out these ships, it probably would have been far faster
to have used airpower.

For instance, IMO the B-29s in China was the most wasteful Allied
campaign of the war. They would have been far better employed
based in Australia, laying mines to choke off the Japanese oil lifeline
from the then Dutch East Indies.