Operation August Storm

[temujin77]

Many of us think of Russia, at least post-Operation Barbarossa, as one of the Allies. Sure Stalin was buddies with Hitler during the invasion of Eastern Europe, but after Hitler tore up the non-aggression pact, Russia came around and joined the Allies, right?

Well... Not completely.

Russia's alliance with the Western Allies was somewhat "partial". Russia remained friendly with Japan; many of us overlook that fact. In fact, near the very end of WW2, Japan viewed Russia as such a friend that the potential existed of using Russia as an intermediary to broker peace with the United States.

That all changed in August 1945, when Russia launched Operation August Storm, which was Stalin's attempt at occupying, with intention of keeping, Chinese and Japanese territory. Over 1.5 million Russian soldiers organized in 80 divisions rushed into Manchuria, wiping aside Japanese defenders. More details of the battle can be found at the following link.

WW2DB: Operation August Storm

Though most westerners believe the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the events that drove Japan to surrender, the atomic bombs were actually only part of the equation. Russia's surprise attack on Japan destroyed all remaining hope for Japan to attain a conditional surrender.

In terms of future consequences, the Russian occupation of Manchuria provided a safe haven for Mao Zedong's Communist forces, with which they eventually gathered enough strength to drive the Nationalists off of mainland China several years later.

[Jim O]

I have to say that I disagree almost entirely with your interpretation of history.

Originally Posted by temujin77

Russia remained friendly with Japan;

That's pretty much a misstatement of fact. Though they both honored a neutrality pact (entered into prior to Barbarossa) that hardly meant that they were friends. They did not trust one another. Each was afraid of the other and neither could manage a war against the other while maintaining any semblance of fight on their main front. Japan was concerned about her War in Asia and the Pacific, while the Soviets were fighting for their very existence on their Western front. A battle in Asia, either an invasion of Manchuria by the Soviets or of Siberia by the Japanese was essentially out of the question. Stalin made a promise to the Western Allies to enter the war within three months of the end of the war in Europe, a promise that he kept. Yes, the timing was opportunistic, but such is the nature of collecting the spoils of war.

Originally Posted by temujin77

Stalin was buddies with Hitler during the invasion of Eastern Europe

Again, not really a true representation of fact. The truth is they were never anything of the sort of buddies. They had mutual interests and were co-belligerents for a time, but they also distrusted and disliked each other on a personal and political level. They certainly were not allies in any sense of the word. To say that they hated each other may not be a distortion of the truth.

Originally Posted by temujin77

Though most westerners believe the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the events that drove Japan to surrender, the atomic bombs were actually only part of the equation. Russia's surprise attack on Japan destroyed all remaining hope for Japan to attain a conditional surrender.

This may be true but most Americans (and foreigners) also think that the US Civil War was about slavery. I think that anyone who has studied this conflict in even a rudimentary fashion knows that the Soviet Union was about to launch an invasion of Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan's main islands. The Japanese were well aware of this and feared the Russians more than they feared the US. Hence their choice to surrender rather than fall even partially under Soviet dominion.

Originally Posted by temujin77

In terms of future consequences, the Russian occupation of Manchuria provided a safe haven for Mao Zedong's Communist forces, with which they eventually gathered enough strength to drive the Nationalists off of mainland China several years later.

Also a bit of a simplification. The plain fact is that the Nationalists lost the civil war because of poor decisions on the part of their leaders and the fact that they were unpopular with the people. They were blamed for the losses to Japan, the government was corrupt, and the economy was in shambles. No amount of weapons were going to defeat an ultimately "popular" insurgency.

[Panzermacher]

Jim is Correct in his statements. When Russia pulled many of it's Siberian divisions to help bolster Stalingrad's defense, There were a substantial increase in Japanese/Russian border clashes. To say the least, the two countries were NOT friendly toward each other. The Soviet Union had designs only many of the Northern Japanese Islands, that they had claimed were their territory for years. The August attack was justification to get them all back and more.... If Hitler had not pulled Barbarossa when he did, Stalin may have went after Japanese holdings much earlier. HE already had the army there to do it.......but Hitler may have ruined that plan.
The Stalin Government was all about expansion, never about friends. Friends were convenient til you could sneak one in on them. (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia)

[temujin77]

I knew it! Bring up a controversial topic and responses will follow! ^_^

I definitely agree Stalin and Hitlers were friends only out of convenience. Same with Moscow and Tokyo. Since the non-aggression pact between Russia and Japan, they had maintained diplomatic relations. In fact, near the end of the war, Japan actively courted Russia as an intermediary for negotiations with the Western Allies. The sudden tearing up of the non-aggression pact was very much so a blow to the little Japanese morale that were left after the Hiroshima bombing, and that declaration of war alone, even if the Russians never actually invaded in force, would had been enough driving force to still lead to the unconditional surrender.

The Russian invasion of Manchuria, attempted invasion of Korea, invasion of the Kuril Islands, and the planned invasion of Hokkaido had little to do with the promise to the Western Allies. They were definitely all territorial conquests in nature. Definitely all opportunistic like Jim said.

[Jim O]

Originally Posted by temujin77

Japan actively courted Russia as an intermediary for negotiations with the Western Allies.

Be that as it may, the Western Allies would hear none of it. The demand for unconditional surrender was a firm one on the part of the US. If there was any desire on the part of the Western Allies to negotiate, it could have been done through another "neutral" entity.

[temujin77]

Originally Posted by Jim O

Be that as it may, the Western Allies would hear none of it. The demand for unconditional surrender was a firm one on the part of the US. If there was any desire on the part of the Western Allies to negotiate, it could have been done through another "neutral" entity.

Well, I was looking more so from the Russo-Japanese relationship only. Japan thought Russia was such a friend, and near-end of war there were strong of a sentiment believing Russia would be "friendly enough" to be a channel of communication with the Western Allies. The sudden loss of that channel was a heavy blow of Japanese morale, then furthermore, it was not just a lost of channel, but beyond it, that channel became hostile!

[lufttiger]

You bring up some good points that make people think a bit more, nothing
wrong with that at all, thats how i learn about new stuff all the time.

My thought on the Russian and Japanese realtionship was always one of
turmoil like the others say. There was the naval victory Japan had against Russia decades earlier. Then in '39 Japan invaded Russia and got their butts
kicked big time.

But like you i wonder why they did pick Russia as the go between for talks.
Maybe they thought they were our closest ally that would of been more willing to help??

Can you imagine them trying to use China or Australia, they both had bad gruges against Japan.

[Jim O]

Originally Posted by temujin77

Well, I was looking more so from the Russo-Japanese relationship only. Japan thought Russia was such a friend, and near-end of war there were strong of a sentiment believing Russia would be "friendly enough" to be a channel of communication with the Western Allies. The sudden loss of that channel was a heavy blow of Japanese morale, then furthermore, it was not just a lost of channel, but beyond it, that channel became hostile!

You can say it as many ways as you want but you would still be wrong. They were not friends. Not before the war, not during the war, and not after the war. "Friends" do not fight in major battles like Khalkhin-Gol (known in Japan as the Nomonhan Incident). "Friends" do not maintain highly militarized borders. And "friends" do not need time limited "non-aggression" (neutrality) pacts. No doubt there were those within Japan who hoped that the Soviets would not enter the war, or would ally with them. However, anyone who believed the Soviets to be "friends" after Stalin referred to them as an "aggressor" in his November 1944 speech marking the anniversary of the revolution was seriously deluding themselves.

An excellent read on the subject is Yukiko Koshiro | Eurasian Eclipse: Japan's End Game in World War II | The American Historical Review, 109.2 | The History Cooperative. Some brief excepts:

It was the Soviet Union that gave Japan strategic versatility in exiting the world war. The Soviet entry into the war during its last phase is portrayed simply as a betrayal to Japan in light of the Neutrality Pact. Conversely, the Imperial Japanese Army and government have been criticized for wasting time in hoping for the Soviets to help broker peace with the United States. Such vilification of the Soviet Union, however, has obfuscated a complex strategy Japan adopted toward the Soviets. A body of little-known and rarely used documents, kept since 1941 by Japanese military leaders, diplomatic officials, and scholars and journalists of international relations, reveals that these Japanese did not adhere to any hopes for Moscow to mediate peace with the United States. Neither did they hold onto a naïve anticipation for a break-up of the Moscow-Washington Grand Alliance, which would supposedly bring Japan its preferred terms for surrender. On the contrary, these Japanese were firmly convinced of eventual Soviet abrogation of the Neutrality Pact and entry into the war. They meticulously studied the possible timing of a Soviet attack and the manner of subsequent collapse of Japan's colonial empire, specifically the Soviet impact on postwar East Asia. In their perceptions, the Soviet Union possessed an ability to achieve a balance of power against the United States in a postwar world. Moreover, the Soviet presence would, they hoped, prevent the United States from establishing hegemony in East Asia and recreating it solely in its image. And ultimately, the Soviet influence in East Asia would restrain harsh U.S. control of post-surrender Japan...



By the time the Japanese navy suffered its fatal defeat by U.S. forces at Leyte Gulf in the fall of 1944, the Japanese government had lost any hope that its continental empire would survive intact. While the prospect of unconditional surrender to the United States was difficult to accept, the Japanese government had neither the intention nor the resources to resist a U.S. invasion of the home islands. As far as the decoded Ultra reports were concerned, in which Tokyo's peace negotiations with Moscow were intercepted and deciphered by Washington, the Japanese government, by early to mid-1945, seemed to be desperate for Soviet assistance. In reality, the Japanese leaders did not anticipate Soviet good will. On December 8 [sic], 1941, only two weeks after Pearl Harbor, and less than eight months after the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact, General Hata Shunroku reported his conviction that the Soviets would eventually enter the war against Japan, and he added that this was the common understanding among top Japanese military leaders. Even Matsuoka Yosuke himself had no illusions. While in semi-retirement during the Pacific War, he was once asked privately whether the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union was a mistake. He rebuked the idea, claiming that he never trusted Stalin anyway; that is, although he knew the Soviet Union was a most untrustworthy nation, he had to conclude the pact because that was the only way to secure Japan's territorial integrity.

[temujin77]

Hey that is a nice article, thanks Jim!

[Panzermacher]

Pretty much what I have read....Stalin was basically in it for Stalin...and Many Japanese Military leaders soon realized this, some too late......