Day vs Night Bombing?

[Holly6]

In reading Karl's link on the RAF Bomber Command, I again had questions about the idea behind this two-pronged strategy. I'm under the impression that one reason for this option was that BC was pretty beat up by the time the USAAF could make an impact on the Theater.
Was this the primary motivation, or was it more due to available arsenals? Could it have just been a result of wanting to keep 24 hour pressure on the Axis?

[Commander Waffle]

I thought the day bombings wee because they couldn't see all the targets at night, and day time bombings were to either be more accurate (if a 5 mile radius is accurate) missions, or to mop up night time bombings.

However, now that you mention 24 hour pressure, that seems like a bigger reason.

[Tom Houlihan]

The RAF preferred night bombing, as it was harder to spot the attackers. The USAAF preferred daylight missions, as it was easier to see primary and alternate targets. The round-the-clock pressure was just an added bonus of the two differing approaches.,

[Holly6]

Originally Posted by Tom Houlihan

The RAF preferred night bombing, as it was harder to spot the attackers. The USAAF preferred daylight missions, as it was easier to see primary and alternate targets. The round-the-clock pressure was just an added bonus of the two differing approaches.,

I agree with your statement, but the RAF wouldn't have switched to night attacks simply to protect their people/aircraft if the results were significantly inferior. (My opinion) And the Americans wouldn't have forced their people to bomb in daylight unless there was a measurable success rate.

Were they assigned different targets? Perhaps more carpet bombing for night missions and specific targets for the daytime?

[MAGNA]

The interesting thing about the bombing is that German production went up even as the bombing did.

The other side of the coin was the resources Germany had to put into countering the bombing. AA defences in the form of shelters, guns, and aircraft were significant drains on the German war machine.

The school of thought that strategic bombing could win a war was sorely tested though.

[Holly6]

Originally Posted by MAGNA

The interesting thing about the bombing is that German production went up even as the bombing did.

The other side of the coin was the resources Germany had to put into countering the bombing. AA defences in the form of shelters, guns, and aircraft were significant drains on the German war machine.

The school of thought that strategic bombing could win a war was sorely tested though.

You're right, I remember reading the aircraft production figures at the end of the war and was suprised to see the quanity produced. Still wondering if anybody has done some research into why the two decided on that arrangement. It beats doing my own reading.

[RAF Liberators]

I'll post more later, but for the most part the RAF went for the night bombing approach based on some quite disasterous daylight raids early on in the war.
Bomber Command switched to night raids long before the USAAF got involved in the ETO or even WWII.

[Holly6]

Originally Posted by RAF Liberators

I'll post more later, but for the most part the RAF went for the night bombing approach based on some quite disasterous daylight raids early on in the war.
Bomber Command switched to night raids long before the USAAF got involved in the ETO or even WWII.

Thanks RAF, I'd read that somewhere, and it was why I was wondering if the lack of crews or the danger in reducing them was a reason. Flight Crews became more scarce than planes for several groups as the war went on.

[Geek44]

As a fairly general statement, I'd say that the four engined American types were far more heavily armed for defence than the British types too. They also flew in tight formation so that the aircraft could back each other up defensively...20 guns are better than six. This kind of design advantage could only be used during the day when tight formation flying was possible. It's been mentioned that the defence of the Reich caused considerable strain on the German war effort and that is indeed so. In the BBC series from the seventies, Albert Speer himself describes it as a 'so-called second front'. Whatever the results of the bombing itself, this fact alone goes some way toward justifying the bombing campaigns of both the US and the UK...for years, the campaign drew resources away from the Eastern Front before Overlord occurred. My two cents.
Peace.

[RAF Liberators]

On the 4th of September 1939 15 Blenheims and 14 Wellingtons set out for a daylight attack on the German fleet lying off Wilhelmshaven. Of the 29 aircraft, 19 found their target but apparently caused only negligible damage, although 7 planes were lost. No further raids were made until December when an attack on similar targets on the 3rd proved inconclusive, no damage being caused and no bombers lost. On the 14th a raid by 12 Wellingtons resulted in the loss of 5 planes, while on the 18th of 22 Wellingtons sent on a comparable mission only 10 returned. The Battle of the Heligoland Blight, as it was later called, had been partly won by the Germans own early warning radar system which allowed their fighters time to meet the raiders.
For the British, the raids accross Heligoland Blight raised awkward problems. It had been part of received R.A.F. policy that when bombing restrictions were eventually lifted mass daylight raids on the Ruhr would start to cut German industrial sinews. But if losses of 50% or more were to be incurred during these raids that involved no penetration of Germany itself, then daylight attacks on the Ruhr would be nothing less than the suicide of Bomber Command.
Men who had spent much of their professional lives planning such operations were reluctant to face the facts, particularly in the view of the only alternative: a policy of night raiding for which training had been negligible and for which navigational aids were virtually non-existent. Missgivings were strengthened when, in mid March, a force of 50 Whitleys and 20 Hampdens attracked a German seaplane base at Hornum on the island of Sylt. Although conditions were good and the target relatively easy to find, 5 planes (7% of the attacking force) were unable to locate it, and despite the fact that the 15 tons of bombs were dropped damage was slight.
By 1940 one main role of the bombers in the Advanced Air Striking Force was the destruction of bridges crossing the network of rivers and canals which would of barred the German advance through Belgium, Holland and France. The aircraft available to the force were comprised of 10 Squadrons of Fairey Battles, designed as light bombers to attack enemy troops in trenches, and 2 Squadrons of Bristol Blenheims, aicraft only slightly inadequately equipped for the job. Of 12 Battles sent in a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to destroy the bridge at Maastricht only one returned. On 90 sorties flown against the Gaulier bridge, 40 aircraft were lost and the bridge remained unhit, while of 12 Blenheims flown against another nearby target only 1 returned.
Casualties at this level finally convinced the Air Staff that daylight raids on the Ruhr, if and when allowed, would mean the virtual extiction of Bomber Command. An alternative had to be sought quickly since on 15th May the War Cabinet raised the ban on bombing east of the Rhine. The reason was the destruction of Rotterdam by the Luftwaffe the previous day, a target which the dutch claimed to be an open city but which the Germans regarded as a fortified area (see the war crimes thread), and on the night of 15th May 99 heavy bombers were sent to attack oil and railway targets in the Ruhr. Thus began what was to be a five year assault on Germany itself.
America entered the war in 1941 and the first units of USAAF appeared in 1942 by this time the R.A.F. were already committed to flying night operations.
I believe that I read somewhere that they initially also tried night time raids but they resulted in pretty poor results. Greater achievements were found with the box formations flying during the day, the rest is history.