S. France Invasion before D-Day?

[Brett]

Hello:

I was wondering if anybody had any knowledge of
plans for an invasion of S. France in ’43 or ’44 before
D-day. I understand that the historic invasion was originally planned for the same day as D-day but had to be postponed due to LST shortages.

However, at least as an amateur strategist it seems that an invasion much earlier than D-day would have put Germany in a huge dilemma. Fight hard against the S. France invasion and risk being cut off by the cross channel invasion. Or withdraw to a defensible line, and abandon valuable territory, plus give the Allies maneuvering room that would aid a breakthrough. In
addition, I’m assuming that weather in the Med would allow an invasion much earlier & later in the year than the channel.

From all my reading of the strategic debates at this time, a S. France invasion is not even mentioned. The Americans were gung ho for the cross channel assault, while the British wanted to invade Italy and press on into the Balkans.

My question is: Was there an explicit decision to reject a S. France invasion in ’43 or ’44 before D-Day? Or were the British and Americans so fixated on their respective strategies that a pre D-Day S. France invasion was not even considered?

Also, I’ve seen one map indicating Allied landings in Sardinia in Sept. ’43 & Corsica in Oct. ’43. Was there fighting on these islands? Or had they been occupied by the Italians, and so after
the Italian surrender there was no opposition?


(One story I have read about the Anglo-American strategic debates occurred at the August ’43 Quebec conference. A break from bitter arguments between the British & Americans happened when scientists demonstrated strengthened ice for a proposed
iceberg carrier.

Americans grumbled that this was a typical
Churchill hare-brained scheme to avoid committing to D-day, as the heavily guarded special ice was rolled in.

General Arnold, the AAF CO was given a sledgehammer and asked to hit the ice – which would have shattered ordinarily. Instead, Arnold howled in pain without damaging the ice at all.Whereupon a scientist whipped out a pistol & shot at the ice. The bullet ricocheted off, without even scratching the ice.

Guards outside the room, who had been hearing the angry voices of the dispute all day, looked at each other in deep concern when they heard Arnold’s yell. Then when the shot rang out they shouted, “Oh my God, now the Americans and British are shooting each other!”)

[gary g stevens]

Hello Brett. The ice ship you was asking about was called A Habbakuk. The vessel was to be made with a material called Pykrete( Pykes concrete) The material was ice and woodchips and was invented by Geoffrey Pyke. There was A small model built in Canada ,but it went no further then that.The ship would have been huge with a like wise price tag.

[temujin77]

Originally Posted by Brett

My question is: Was there an explicit decision to reject a S. France invasion in ’43 or ’44 before D-Day? Or were the British and Americans so fixated on their respective strategies that a pre D-Day S. France invasion was not even considered?

Pre-Normandy, the Americans were fixated on a cross-channel invasion while the British, fueled strongly by Churchill's "Europe's soft underbelly" (Italy and Balkans) philosophy, wanted to go through Italy. As the British-favored Italian campaign slowly grounded down to a near stand-still, the Americans won a political victory by getting the Normandy campaign they wanted. In order to compliment the northern France campaign, the Americans once again pushed for the need of a southern France operation. Upon hearing the arguments again, Churchill wrote Eisenhower:

We no longer had any need of the port of Marseilles and the line of communication leading northward from it. Troops from America could come in via Brittany.

The attack through the south of France was far removed geographically from the troops in northern France that there was no tactical connection between them.

So I think the reason why Operation Dragoon did not take place until 15 Aug 1944 is because political objection from the UK. Interestingly, by Aug 1944, the Normandy campaign was largely over; Aug 1944 was when the Falaise Pocket was closed.

[Brett]

Originally Posted by temujin77

... Upon hearing the arguments again, Churchill wrote Eisenhower:

I apologize for the long delay in replying.

I disagree with Churchill that a S. France landing before D-Day is
"far removed geographically from the troops in northern France that there was no tactical connection between them."

This is because:

1) An active front would inevitability suck troops from an
inactive front. So some of the troops in Normandy would end
have ended up in S. France.

2) Air attack would destroy more German forces. When a front
is active, reinforcements & material have to take more risks
to get to the front in time, exposing them to more danger.
The supply line to S. France would be longer too, leading
to more damage, all exposed to air attack from the Med &
the UK.

3) Potentially, S. France Allied forces might break out,
alleviating the need for any D-Day invasion at all.

[MAGNA]

The major problem with a S. France invasion larger than what was done was logistics. The distance from Britain and the trip required for a start. Air power would be less as well compared to being able to nip across the channel and back.

An invasion of S. France had it's merits but didn't compare favourably with a cross channel effort. A large landing in the lower France region could well have found itself in serious trouble.

[phylo_roadking]

It's been a long time since I read it, but, once upon a time I read that the delay of Dragoon was also partly political...in that it hung the Maquis' risings in Central France, Vercours etc., out to dry - but I've heard TWO alternative reasons why :-

1/ it removed a possible Maquis political challenge to DeGaulle after Liberation, many Maquis' groups being Socilaist at best, Marxist at worst,

or

2/ it thus destroyed a major source OF possible DeGaulle support in the expected turbulent French post-liberation political scene.

[PatBC]

I do not think the British or the US would be that concerned about the fate of DeGaulle after the war. During the war he was useful but I think the other allies were willing to live without him. After most partisan did not support Degaulle and to the Allies that support was more important then DeGaulle.

[Whiterook]

Originally Posted by MAGNA

The major problem with a S. France invasion larger than what was done was logistics. The distance from Britain and the trip required for a start. Air power would be less as well compared to being able to nip across the channel and back.

An invasion of S. France had it's merits but didn't compare favourably with a cross channel effort. A large landing in the lower France region could well have found itself in serious trouble.

I agree with this statement...it would most likely have become horribly bogged down. Mounting an invasion that far south would have perhaps given the Germans way too much time to mount and fortify their attack posture, don't you think?

[Brett]

Originally Posted by phylo_roadking

It's been a long time since I read it, but, once upon a time I read that the delay of Dragoon was also partly political...in that it hung the Maquis' risings in Central France, Vercours etc., out to dry - but I've heard TWO alternative reasons why :-

1/ it removed a possible Maquis political challenge to DeGaulle after Liberation, many Maquis' groups being Socilaist at best, Marxist at worst,

or

2/ it thus destroyed a major source OF possible DeGaulle support in the expected turbulent French post-liberation political scene.

Interesting theory on delaying invasion to weaken the
French underground. I had never heard that before. Do
you happen to recall where you saw it? Is there a map
of areas the French underground were strong in ’44?


*************************************************

I would still disagree that the disadvantages of launching
an earlier S. France invasion outweigh the advantages.
Admittedly, the logistical problems would be huge &
it forces aircraft to fly further.

But at least from a quick glance at a map it doesn’t
look a lot further from Corsica to S. France invasion
beaches as from UK to some D-Day beaches. And I
am assuming the weather is much better in the Med
then the channel

(Anzio did go in January after all – true that’s further
S., but I’m guessing that Dragoon could have gone much
earlier in the year than D-Day … Is there a meteorologist
who can comment?)

Supply lines for the Germans would be longer, and
with better weather they would be more exposed to air
attacks. If the French underground was stronger in
the South, that would help too.

An invasion in the S. drawing heavy German strength
there & then D-Day landings could potentially cut off
Germans in the S. The reverse case with D-Day 1st
meant that German forces moving N. weren’t faced
with a landing threatening their line of retreat.

Even if Dragoon did get bogged down, I would still
argue it was better than the historical alternative of
crawling up Italy. And an invasion in say April or
May ’44 would not necessarily need to be larger
than historically with Overlord soon after.

[Jumpmaster6]

First off, the shot at the pykrete actually ricocheted and hit another officer in the room, wounding him. That is where the "they are shooting each other" comment came from.

But to your main topic.... Tactically, with the fight in Italy still underway, the decision to invade the Normandy region was twofold. It would essentially create a third front to do so. Russia in the east, Italy to the South, and France to the West. Southern France could be supported by extending the combat line from Italy. Northwest France itself is a separate thing entirely. The fight in Italy with the beach heads proved hard to support through the Med with France still in enemy hands. It was easier to support with supplies coming straight from England across the channel (and the U.S. shipping lanes). More troops could be poured in, and the bottleneck that was experienced in Italy at the Hermann Goering Division line would not be extended. Also, it would not play into the fears of the German Wehrmacht that Patton had a command just 22 miles from the Calais Port. It was this deception plan that kept the Panzer Divisions in reserve, and would not support the Normandy invasions, even AFTER the invasion had begun. It was viewed that Normandy was the ruse, and not the main effort. Also, little known to everyone was that America had a huge number of "phantom" divisions in the Order of Battle. We had phantom Airborne Divisions, and the phantom Army under Patton. What would happen was that these patches for the phantom units were created, and soldiers were told to wear them on pass. Also, it was instructed to them that they were to get into bar fights so it would be reported to the press that "PVT Joe Schmoe from the 12345 Airborne Division was charged with drunk in public and assault" (I am just using 12345. There was no phantom unit named this). Anyway, the German undercover spies would report this as proof the Division existed. After the capture of their documents, we found that the Germans had actually correctly placed these phantom units into the Order of Battle. It was these phantom divisions, the placement of fake aircraft, inflatable tanks, fake ships etc.. that played into the Normandy invasion plans. Hope that helps a little. Tom.