Stategic Bombing

[Hobilar]

The Royal Air Force entered the Second World War committed to demonstrate that the air dropped bomb was a weapon of unique potential. The Airmen at that time were extremely jealous of protecting their freedom from the other armed services and this ledn to an obsession amongst the Air Staff with the desire to acquire an independent offensive role for their service. This independent offensive role was one that, it was seen, could be fulfilled by the Strategic Bomber, and in this the four-engine heavy bomber fleet of the RAF was a unique asset.

In the winter of 1941-1942 Churchill was to make one of his rare `errors of judgement' in committing so much of British manpower and resources to the Strategic Bomber programme. Although the airmen were denied their `4,000 plan' they were still allowed to embark on their own ambitious war aims. Aims that after the war Sir Henry Tizard was to describe with these words:

" No one thinks now that it would have been possible to defeat Germany by bombing alone, the actual effort in manpower and resources was greater than the value in manpower and resources of the damage caused"

By the spring of 1944 it was becoming clear that Harris's area bombing campaign was failing to bring Germany close to defeat. German industry proved to be astonishingly resilient in the face of bombing and that the overall importance of strategic bombing had been greatly exaggerated. Even US General Arnold was to openly say that the bombing of factories from one end of the Reich to the other was not having the effect that had been hoped for. The Air Staff's gravest error seems to have been an inability to accept that they had overstated the ability of Strategic bombing to undermine the German economy. Even after the war it was commonly accepted that the Bomber campaign had been a decisive contribution in Germany's downfall.

This is not meant to be a criticism of the brave and courageous aircrew whose sacrifice and dedication to duty is above reproach, but rather a comment on a policy that was just so great that it was beyond the resources of the Air Staff. In fact the two greatest results of the Allied bombing campaign, it is now generally accepted, were the destruction of the Luftwaffe as a fighting force and the disruption of German Oil supplies. We should not however be to overcritical of the Air Staff for it must be remembered that Air bombardment of a nation's entire economic strata was a new and virtually untried experiment in warfare. The lessons were being learnt by trial and error.

Harris in a letter to Sir Norman Bottomley in March 1945 was to answer some of the criticisms being made against the Air Campaign. In this letter Harris was to say that although personally he found the bombing of German Cities repugnant and that he took "little delight in the work". He made it clear that in his opinion it was a necessary business, aimed entirely at destroying the German ability to continue hostilities, to shorten the war and save the lives of allied ground forces. To this end he felt that it was necessary to continue the offensive until either the entire German industrial complex had been destroyed or until Germany could be occupied by allied Armies against "unorganised resistance". He also defended the priority of attacking cities on the grounds that HE bombs were in short supply whilst there was a plentiful supply of incendiaries. This seems a very odd attitude from a man who had been a leading exponent of precision bombing between the wars.

After the war the Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden computed that 593,000 German civilians had been killed between 1939-1945, with 3.37 million dwellings destroyed, including 600,000 in the Berlin area. .

[Jim O]

This is an interesting analysis, but there was another, unintended, effect. While what happened to German cities in the bombing is certainly regrettable, IMO it did help to convince citizens of the Reich that they had been completely and thoroughly beaten. Perhaps my feeling is not "politically correct" but only near total destruction of much of Germany and her armed forces was going to force the necessary "attitude adjustment" on the collective psyche. Otherwise, the Allies risked the rise of another ultra-nationalist government and World War III.

[Hobilar]

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[Jim O]

Originally Posted by Hobilar

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[Sarge]

I tend to agree with jim here. In the beginning using Bomber Command was the only way that the UK could hit back and strike at Germany proper.

Some fundamental errors were made along the way, however, the Bombing offensive also forced German industry to waste fantastic resources that could have been deployed elsewhere. Thousand of AA guns that under other circumstances could have been made into tanks instead. A huge building programme of shelters. The disruption to communications centres and of course the constant worry for all where the Bomber fleets would strike next. I believe the effort was justified up until the begining of 1945.

Lets also not forget the 55.000 RAF Aircrew who died on Ops and the almost 20,000 others who died in training and accidents unrelated to actual Ops. They were the Cream of Britian and it can be argued that Bomber Command was the most technically advanced force of any nation in WW2.

[Klaus]

@Jim: Your feelings are politicly incorrect (shame on you ) but it is simply the truth. Demoralizing the german people was a necessary. Or there would have been more than just the rumors of Werewolf groups.

[Jim O]

Originally Posted by Klaus

@Jim: Your feelings are politicly incorrect (shame on you ) but it is simply the truth.

I know. I'm very bad...

[Klaus]

Thats better. Now stand in the corner and be ashamed of yourself at least three times!

[Ingsoc]

Originally Posted by Jim O

This is an interesting analysis, but there was another, unintended, effect. While what happened to German cities in the bombing is certainly regrettable, IMO it did help to convince citizens of the Reich that they had been completely and thoroughly beaten. Perhaps my feeling is not "politically correct" but only near total destruction of much of Germany and her armed forces was going to force the necessary "attitude adjustment" on the collective psyche. Otherwise, the Allies risked the rise of another ultra-nationalist government and World War III.

Not exacly, no doubt it's play a part in the "attitude adjustment" and it's prove to everyone that the reich truely lost the war, however it's actually was the economic miracle in post war Germany that finally made the Germans abandon their nationalist attitudes.

Here some surveys done by the US army in occupied Germany:

1945 - just after the war, 44% of under 19 people ("youth") and 22% above 19 people ("adults") thought that the rebuild of Germany should be done by a "new and strong Fuhrer".

After the Nuremberg trials - 12% said they supported Hitler until the end of the war, 35% claim they never believe in Hitler, and 16% said they believed Hitler only until the outburst of the war.

1 of 2 Germans in the American and British zones believe that Nazism was good as an ideology and only the fullfilment was bad.

1950 - 10% saw Hitler as a great statesman, second only to Bismarck.

1952 - 25% had a "good opinion" about Hitler, 10% saw his as the greatest statesman in the 20th century, 22% said while Hitler made some mistakes he was an excellent head of state, and 33% still condem the attemp on Hitler live in the July plot.

1953 - 14% would vote for a man like Hitler.

In the middle of the 60es only 4% said they would vote for someone like Hitler, and only 3% think that Hitler achievments was greater than any other German leader.

(Taken from "The 'Hitler Myth'" by Ian Kershaw)

So as you can see the support for Hitler was greatly diminsh when Germany felt the fruites of the economic miracle.

[Jim O]

Originally Posted by Ingsoc

Not exacly, no doubt it's play a part in the "attitude adjustment" and it's prove to everyone that the reich truely lost the war, however it's actually was the economic miracle in post war Germany that finally made the Germans abandon their nationalist attitudes.

Here some surveys done by the US army in occupied Germany:

1945 - just after the war, 44% of under 19 people ("youth") and 22% above 19 people ("adults") thought that the rebuild of Germany should be done by a "new and strong Fuhrer".

After the Nuremberg trials - 12% said they supported Hitler until the end of the war, 35% claim they never believe in Hitler, and 16% said they believed Hitler only until the outburst of the war.

1 of 2 Germans in the American and British zones believe that Nazism was good as an ideology and only the fullfilment was bad.

1950 - 10% saw Hitler as a great statesman, second only to Bismarck.

1952 - 25% had a "good opinion" about Hitler, 10% saw his as the greatest statesman in the 20th century, 22% said while Hitler made some mistakes he was an excellent head of state, and 33% still condem the attemp on Hitler live in the July plot.

1953 - 14% would vote for a man like Hitler.

In the middle of the 60es only 4% said they would vote for someone like Hitler, and only 3% think that Hitler achievments was greater than any other German leader.

(Taken from "The 'Hitler Myth'" by Ian Kershaw)

So as you can see the support for Hitler was greatly diminsh when Germany felt the fruites of the economic miracle.

I don't disagree with anything that you said, but it doesn't relate to my thesis. They didn't ask the question "Do you believe that Germany really lost the war?". I imagine that if you asked that question in 1945-48 the answer would have been a resounding "yes" based in part, at least, on the devastation wrought by the bombings, the occupation, food shortages, and the hardships of forced relocation of ethnic Germans into what was left of the country. If you asked that question in the 1920's the answer might not have been the same. A large portion of the population at that time subscribed to the "we were stabbed in the back" excuse for the loss in the first world war. That's the attitude adjustment to which I referred. Now that they knew they'd been really and truly beaten they were unlikely to try again.

I think it's natural for a defeated power to not feel good about it and that reflects in those numbers. People don't like to admit they made a mistake. (Ask anyone who has ever been divorced. ) But not feeling good about it and accepting reality are two very different things.