Late-War Russian Success, 44-45.....

[Stephan H.]

As a suggestion, I would compare the various effects of Soviet Operational performance between the "Vistual-Oder" Operation and the "Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation."

You will find that the Soviets used the same tactics and operational principles but both operations had very different experiences.

Contrary to popular history that assumes that the Red Army had somehow become this professional, experienced, well trained, and equipped military organization that proved more than capable of handling the Whermacht.

The truth is a bit different. The Soviet's were experience a manpower crisis by 1945. Red Army divisions were now down to 2,000-4,000 men. It was suffering both morale and discipline problems. Political Commissars now instituted an old Imperial Army practice of carrying Banners into battle during the Berlin Operation. The Red Army was well equipped and armed, though it suffered in certain modern military gear like wireless radio communications.

Operationally, the Red Army practiced no combined-arms training between infantry and armor formations that caused significant losses. In addition, Soviet Commanders demonstrated an operational inflexibility that was capitalized on by German commanders (like Heinrici during the battle for the Seelow Heights).

What made the January 1945 offensive so succesful vs the April offensive was how the Whermacht defended. The German Army defended the main line, not in depth, and had no operational reserves--typical for the German Army in the East after 1943. In April, with Hitler's permission, Army Group Vistula established the first fixed defensive line in-depth on the Eastern Front, with armor reserves. Despite the fact that the Wehrmacht was outnumbered in every category of manpower and equipment, the Soviet's suffered losses that were not seen since the German invasion of the Soviet in Union in 1941. The Soviets lost more tanks, aircraft and equipment than they did at Kursk in 1943 when they faced a better equiped enemy.

I detail all this in [u]Bloody Streets[u]. When I started my research, I didn't think I'd find these conclusions, but that's where my research and analysis took me. BTW, these conclusions are drawn from a varity of sources, and surprisingly many Soviet commanders and Soviet Official Histories themselves.

Stephan

[PatBC]

Originally Posted by Stephan H.

As a suggestion, I would compare the various effects of Soviet Operational performance between the "Vistual-Oder" Operation and the "Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation."

You will find that the Soviets used the same tactics and operational principles but both operations had very different experiences.

Contrary to popular history that assumes that the Red Army had somehow become this professional, experienced, well trained, and equipped military organization that proved more than capable of handling the Whermacht.

The truth is a bit different. The Soviet's were experience a manpower crisis by 1945. Red Army divisions were now down to 2,000-4,000 men. It was suffering both morale and discipline problems. Political Commissars now instituted an old Imperial Army practice of carrying Banners into battle during the Berlin Operation. The Red Army was well equipped and armed, though it suffered in certain modern military gear like wireless radio communications.

Operationally, the Red Army practiced no combined-arms training between infantry and armor formations that caused significant losses. In addition, Soviet Commanders demonstrated an operational inflexibility that was capitalized on by German commanders (like Heinrici during the battle for the Seelow Heights).

What made the January 1945 offensive so succesful vs the April offensive was how the Whermacht defended. The German Army defended the main line, not in depth, and had no operational reserves--typical for the German Army in the East after 1943. In April, with Hitler's permission, Army Group Vistula established the first fixed defensive line in-depth on the Eastern Front, with armor reserves. Despite the fact that the Wehrmacht was outnumbered in every category of manpower and equipment, the Soviet's suffered losses that were not seen since the German invasion of the Soviet in Union in 1941. The Soviets lost more tanks, aircraft and equipment than they did at Kursk in 1943 when they faced a better equiped enemy.

I detail all this in [u]Bloody Streets[u]. When I started my research, I didn't think I'd find these conclusions, but that's where my research and analysis took me. BTW, these conclusions are drawn from a varity of sources, and surprisingly many Soviet commanders and Soviet Official Histories themselves.

Stephan

Very interesting

[MAGNA]

I voted for superior assets as far as equipment and particularly aircraft went (superior in numbers at least). I agree with the manpower element being a problem for the USSR by the later stages, just as it was for Germany and Britain.

I also voted for lessons learned. Not so much in the field of battefield tactics when it came to the attack but more in the defence side of things. The Pak front as devised by the soviets was highly effective against an enemy which had a known doctrine by the time of Kursk. That was exploited by the defence in depth which allowed the USSR to overcome the German tactical superiority.

[TRDG]

I'm thinking more along the lines of the Bagration operation with "new" Breakthrough attacks and Deep (behind the lines) probing attacks. I need to re-read a PDF on this, then get back here on the subject!!

Cheers

TRDG

Tom

[TRDG]

Found it and it was very interesting!!

Maskirovka is a Russian term that reflects cover and deception in an operation, like Bagration, more on that later though for me.

Some of the basics of Operation Bagration and the new things they employed while doing this operation.
The Russians developed a higher level force structure which allowed them to get deeper penetrations after the breakthrough in this operation. These formations were not to be used/commited to the fight through tactical German defenses, but more along the lines of deep operational or strategic objectives only. Next they were used to take one part of an objective at a time, then follow on forces would go to the next part of the same or even different objective once the first part was a success.

The main force structures leading this was the tank army (Corps-sized echelon composed of two to three tank Korps, division sized elements) and/or one to two mechanized Corps. Another force for deep attacks were cavalry-mechanized groups which were temporary, used mostly if the terrain was not well suited for tanks.

To get these forces through the initial German defenses, there were specialized shock Russian armies used to break through the German defenses and get to the operational or strategic objectives. Then the tank/mech or cavalry-mech would then be introduced to exploit the breakthrough into the rear of the German lines.
These deep penetrating forces were only given the final order by the front commander in concert with a Stavka representative close to the front lines. The Stavka representative was in charge of aproving groups of armies on certain fronts.

Cheers, to be continued.......

Tom

[MAGNA]

Nice info Tom. I haven't explored the 1944-45 campaigns much as far as the Eastern front went.

[TRDG]

Thanks buddy, I find this kind of info very interesting to me, and you don't see it that much on many sites........ At least the ones that I visit anyways!!

Cheers, more on this later.

Tom

[TRDG]

I just found the Russian word for shock Army from a friend of mine on another site.

Udarnaia Armiia, which translates to blowing/beating Army, interesting I think!

Cheers

Tom

[dsfraser]

Originally Posted by TRDG

I thought I might put this one up and see what you guys might think here. I did this one on another site (the one Alex and I first met), and to date after about 9 months up, only 14 votes.......
I have my own thoughts on this, so what are yours?

Cheers

TRDG

Tom

Hey Tom

Just found this site, and have voted.

Cheers
Scott Fraser
Canada

[TRDG]

Thanks Scott, great to see you here, another Russian enthusiast is a good thing at The Zone!!!

Cheers

Tom