[TRDG]

Has anyone else picked this one up besides me? I like this new Duel series they put out, an interesting read, and somewhat different than their regular books they put out.

If anyone is interested in this, I'll run some of the chapter ideas by on the thread here.

Cheers, my first poll.

Tom

[PanzerBob]

TRDG said:

Has anyone else picked this one up besides me? I like this new Duel series they put out, an interesting read, and somewhat different than their regular books they put out.

If anyone is interested in this, I'll run some of the chapter ideas by on the thread here.

Cheers, my first poll.

Tom

Go for it Tom

[Jim O]

I agree. I'd like to hear more.

[TRDG]

Thanks!!

I'll get cracking as soon as time (work) allows....

Cheers

Tom

[Dallas]

This is the first duel title I bought. I thought it was an interesting compare and contrast type work. I would have liked to have seen it a few pages longer with more text and a little less art work. A good though not great work.

[TRDG]

Thanks Dallas

I will hammer out some thoughts Tuesday/wednesday, my many games and work is killling my free time!!

Cheers, now when do I get my vaca again???

Tom

[TRDG]

And here we go.....

This book has many areas covered, but specifically it's about the Panther and T-34 in 1943 in the Ukraine, going from Kursk until the end of 1943 in the battles just West of Kiev in December.

The intro does seem fairly standard, but has some interesting points as well. One of them is the idea that in the past, many ideas about these two machines are just to simplistic. With no critical eye on the reports and facts of their actual combat, just more of a mass of (inferior)T-34s against a lot fewer, but "better" Panther tanks, the good old quantity over quality theme we all know so well. The writer does'nt really get away from this either, but he has a different take on this, than others from the past.

I will leave this intro with this from the book

....quality vs quantity argument tends to overlook the fact that any technical edge in warfare tends to be short lived and that the cost....often means surrendering the production front to the enemy.

Nothing I hav'nt thought or read in other places at one time or another before, but it is very nice to see that in print from someone else from an Osprey book.

Cheers, til' the next post on this, any thoughts or questions yet?

Tom

[PanzerBob]

The author is correct, a technical advantage can be overcome, many ways. Even the event of the T34 & KV's on the battlefield saw many reactions to counter them, in case in point the Panther after some time. However before that other means were used to overcome them, none easy no doubt but countermeasures to be sure.

[TRDG]

Thanks Bob, like getting those 88's front and center for a T-34 tankovy assault, artillery direct fire, German forces directing their fire on the tracks of "the Beasts", as well as targeting gun barrels of K.V.'s in a couple of books as well, and actually hitting them and putting the tanks out of action that way, the Rusky tanks had a gun, but with holes in it, they could'nt fire!! Or if they attemted to, the round blew up in the barrel, could'nt get out of the gun barrel........ but that's another book!!

Cheers

Tom

[TRDG]

To continue

The design and development part of the book on the Panther D had the basics as well, nothing shocking in what I read from the past. In the end of the Panther chapter, the writer points out that....

If ever there was an example that "haste makes waste" in warefare, it lies in the Panther development program.
It goes on to say that the Panther was'nt given enough proper testing for various reasons, from "it might have failed and embarressed the Armaments Ministry" to "Guderian knew the Panther was a loser, but he was silenced by Saur."

The Panther, in the writers opinion had some good features, like the gun and sloped armour, but fell far short of the tank that Guderian requested initially.
The abandonment of the deisel tank engine in a time of the German fuel crisis/shortage that was only growing at the time is another negative impact for him.
I'll leave this section of the book with this, the final word from him in the chapter.

The need for the Panther tank developed because of battlefield realities discovered in 1941, but German developers erred grievously by building a tank that essentially ignored these realities.

Somewhat harsh, but it tends to bring some topics that tend to ring true to me, from what I know of the Panther. My question to the writer of the book is this. What would have happened if the Germans did not have any Panthers during WW II? But that is a more of an "what if" topic then, something to be explored maybe later on that forum!!

Cheers

Tom

[PanzerBob]

Quote

The need for the Panther tank developed because of battlefield realities discovered in 1941, but German developers erred grievously by building a tank that essentially ignored these realities.

I don't how much I'd blame developers, as much as I'd blame the German Intelligence Services and the racially motivated ignorance which caused the System to believe the Red Army would not produce equipment superior to the Wehrmacht. T34 & the KV's were a surprise to the Germans when encountered. Both of which born due to the thoughts by the Soviet Army that the Germans must have something better coming just being kept secret.

One wonders what kind of a successor Panzer would have been the Panzer V or even VI if these Panzers had have been given a more reasonable development time.

[TRDG]

I see your point Robert, I think the writers intent here is after the "fact" of Russian T-34 contact and the ways the Panther finally came about, to many "helping" hands maybe, they could'nt stick with just one good idea and really test it out, but I bet Hitler had more than a little to do on that one...Ha Ha.

Cheers, good reply there.

Tom

[TRDG]

Now for the Rusian T-34/76......

This was a very interesting chapter to me, as I knew some of the ideas talked about, but not the specifics mentioned here in this book!!

It starts off with the Russians having the biggest fleet of tanks at the time, but very lighty armoured and undergunned. As well as a great lack of the tank crews (and Commanders) experience in actual combat, besides the Spanish civil war in October of 1936 ( the T-26B performed "well" there) and attack of Finland by the Russians in November of 1939 (which did not go so well, losing 80 tanks compared to taking out a couple Finnish AT guns in the first week!!!) There was also the issue of the 45mm tank gun not being able to take out bunkers as well.......

Cheers, to be continued.

TRDG

Tom

[bishop]

The Panther wasn't a mistake, it certainly wasn't properly tested, and the Ds that went to Kursk were generally a poor lot, lacking the infrastructure to recover and repair them. The main weakness in the final drive could not ultimately be rectified because Germany no longer had the resources to make the gear that would work. It had the best running gear by far, but the weather as we know was never kind to it so it hasn't been used since, and as for the diesel engine, it was the constant desire to have a suitable engine for all their vehicles, but it was realised that a unit powerful enough wouldn't be available until 46-47. (The Tiger II sorely needed this) The problem in this regard really stems back to the idea that tanks should be able to be filled from the enemy's fuel browsers. That stems back to their first tanks, so its silly to say the Panther had the wrong engine, they couldn't put the right one in. The tank, as we know, had many problems, most of which were sorted or changed. As for the T34 etc, it was a simple tank that could be easily produced... The Sherman of the east, what the Russians lacked was decent well trained tank crews, and radios. Hence the advantages were lost, and sheer production numbers and personnel did overrun technology.