Kalkhin-Gol or Nomohan Incident

[Jim O]

Before World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe, the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June through August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian Manchurian border. This essay follows the daily combat operations of the IJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2 /28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces.

In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K Zhukov (later of WWII fame). When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine dictated that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy. A lack of flexibility doomed the Japanese defensive effort. General Zhukov secretly marshalled his forces and in mid-August used his armor columns to spearhead a double envelopment of the static Japanese units in a position defense. The Soviets encircled the Japanese units, including the 2/28th Infantry, and the Japanese survivors had to fight their way back to friendly lines.


Source: Drea, Edward J, Combined Arms Research Library, Nomohan: Japanese Soviet Tactical COmbat, 1939


For additional maps and information, see Maps 1938-40 (Khalkhin_Gol) and http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/b...lkhin_cut1.pdf

[gao_yixing]

Japanese have never got an army modern and strong enough to fight his western counterparts. As an island nation, developing his army is not the priority.

[Panzermacher]

Japan's infantry were good...man for man...but her weaponry and tactics, and leadership for that matter were poor. Its combined arms doctrine was lacking to say the least. Leaders could not be flexible enough to deal with flowing battle situations. The upper echelon seemed so firm set in a plan that the infantry and tanks would follow, they allowed no alterations to fit the combat. And Japan's tank developments at the time was even far behind the Soviets. Russian mid-level leaders were more free in their action to adapt. And I have always thought this to be the reason why the Japanese came out so bad in this skirmish with the Soviet Union. But, the leadership in the IJA seemed to do this through out the Pacific. Inflexibility seemed to be the norm, until Gen. Kuribayashi changed all that on Iwo Jima.

[R. Evans]

That's a great link for such a little known battle. Thanks for posting it!

Here's a link to a great book on the subject.

Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 - Google Book Search



Maybe the drubbing the IJA took in this incident kept them from attacking the USSR when they were on the ropes in late 1941.