some places to start from

[j stephen galvin]

there are several themes that i would like to explore:

1) what would the war have been like, if as Raeder wanted, it started september 44 not september 39?

2) would american tank design have been any better if it used the christie chassie on the sherman era tanks?

3) the russians pulled off the bluff of ww2 by not getting attacked by japan in 41, could the japanese have taken out the far eastern army of the ussr in 41 to 42?

4) the japanese dedicated substantial resources to china for the duration of the war that just seemed to stand around and do nothing, could the japanese have actually conquered china in 41 to 43?

5) the usa dedicted [by some estimates] only 30% of it's total war effort to the pacific, and still the japanese would not end it sooner, what did the other 70% get us outside of the campaigns in the med and air out of england?

tactical:

battle of the bulge: did we make a mistake in keeping bastone and not letting 5th panzer army go by patton's northward offensive that could have cut it off?

normandy: there is a book out there that postulates that the 12SS panzer division was only days away from being posted to the 84th corps area behind and to the west of 352 inf div. this would possibly wrecked omaha and the invasion?

pacific: yamamoto was the sanest commander the japanese had, a man who could possibly have convinced the leadership to end the war earlier than it did, yet we went out of our way to assasinate him, was this the correct move?

personalities:

i have been fascinated by FRITZ BAYERLING of the panzer lehr. here is a guy who experienced all that the western allies had to offer an enemy.

the career of england's BARNES-WALLACE has never been properly explored, and he did so much for the british war effort.

quips:

it was said at CAEN that when the german air force, when it showed, made the british duck, when the british air came over, the german's ducked, but when the american's ame over ... well everybody ducked.

steve

[Hagen]

Hello J Stephen

Which one of your themes would you like to discuss first?

[TPMM]

I agree with Hagen: which one should be discussed first?

[temujin77]

"pacific: yamamoto was the sanest commander the japanese had, a man who could possibly have convinced the leadership to end the war earlier than it did, yet we went out of our way to assasinate him, was this the correct move?"

A big generalization of Yamamoto, my friend.

Despite my utmost respect for the admiral, Yamamoto was not the superman that everyone made him out to be. First of all, he was not the only one who argued against war; in fact, there was a whole faction who bitterly opposed it. Yamamoto was merely one of them. But getting back on topic, if there was one thing why the US should not had intercepted his transport, it was not because of his anti-war stance before the war, but it was because by then Yamamoto's endless pursuit of a Mahanian victory had already led Japan on a downward spiral. Look at his strategy throughout the conflict at the Solomons Islands. Again and again he could have concentrated his forces to deal a critical blow against the US Navy and probably would set back the eventual Allied victory in the Pacific by months if not years, but he refused to do so. Instead, he sent in forces in small quantities, and ended up frittering away Japanese naval strength. He also suffered from overplanning, making his tactical plans overly complicated and difficult to execute; such a complex plan worked in his favor during the opening stages of the Pacific War, but he should had known luck had something to do with it as well. Finally, Yamamoto must also be partially blamed, at least, for Japan's eventual unpreparedness to supply the military with adequate aircraft and trained pilots.

Yamamoto's mistakes toward 1943 was the reason why the American might re-think the argument for the interception, not because he was "sane". "Yamamoto might have come to be seen, even by the Americans, as an asset to their cause", said historian Dan van der Vat.

[temujin77]

"4) the japanese dedicated substantial resources to china for the duration of the war that just seemed to stand around and do nothing, could the japanese have actually conquered china in 41 to 43?"

Interesting you noted "41 to 43" in your what-if question. Why did you pick those years? Japan violated China's sovereignty as early as Dec 1931, and the Second Sino-Japanese War began in Jul 1937. Why did you pick a date range four years after the official start of the war?