Greek Resistance (and subsequent fighting)

[Jim O]

More than 40 years after the end of World War II much of the history of the resistance and of the subsequent Civil War (1946-49) remains controversial. In the mid-1970s and early 1980s many important documents from British, American, and Greek archives were opened to scholars, and a new debate ensured the revelation of much new material. Nevertheless, to a very large degree interpretations of this period depend on ideological and political biases, and it remains difficult to assign an objectively correct history to the period.

What is clear is that spontaneous resistance sprouted almost from the moment of occupation. The first recorded organized subversion occurred in Macedonia in September and October 1941. The remnants of the predominantly royalist Greek armed forces had been evacuated to the Middle East. Many of the officers who had been purged after 1935 remaine in Greece but, wedded to the idea of traditional set-piece warfare, were reluctant to take up arms since they were hopelessly outmanned and outgunned. The only organized force willing to shoulder the burden of resistance, therefore, was the KKE.

The communist organization had been mauled under the Metaxas regime, but most of its leaders had escaped or had been inexplicably released from prison by the Germans in the weeks before the invasion of the Soviet Union. They quickly began to rebuild and expand their former network. The KKE had been founded in 1918 and was, like all communist parties of the period, closely tied to the Soviet Union. The ground was not exactly fertile for communist recruitment, for there was no indigenous socialist movement. As territorial expansion proceeded in the north, and particularly after the arrival of the refugees after 1922, the party began to attract members from ethnic and religious minorities (Macedonians, Albanians, Slavs, and Muslims) condemned to an inferior social and economic status. It grew rapidly during the Great Depression, especially after 1935 when the party, following the policy of the Communist International (an organization founded and directed by Moscow, also known as Comintern), abandoned the idea of Macedonian autonomy and actively sought alliance with the mainstream parties; but it remained weak, receiving only 9 percent of the vote at its height in 1935.

The threat of Communist participation in a coalition government in 1935 and their leadership of strikes in 1936 precipitated Metaxas' seizure of power. The KKE had always been unusual among Greek parties because of its classical communist structures - a small, disciplined, and ideologically committed membership hierarchically organized and headed by a strong, united leadership - and Metaxas tried to destroy it from within. He came close to succeeding but, ironically, the period of underground activity during the dictatorship gave it precisely the kind of experience necessary for resistance activities.

The National Liberation Front (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon -EAM) was founded in September 1941 as a coalition of five parties, joining Communists, socialists, and some republicans, but it was dominated by the KKE, although this was not generally known at the time. In February 1942 the EAM announced that it was "taking up arms" and formed the National People's Liberation Army (Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos - ELAS). ELAS quickly became the largest national resistance organization, eventually fielding an army of over 1.5 million. Although its recruits came from all social classes and regions, republicanism was a common bond. ELAS' connection with the KKE was purposely kept hidden because the EAM (that is, KKE) leadership feared that the communist label would repel many potential resisters. Nevertheless, the EAM-ELAS spoke openly about imposing a new social order after the war and eventually discussed using the resistance against the occupation as the first step in a revolutionary process. Both the nationalist and the revolutionary themes found an eager audience among the educated, white-collar, urban elite, as well as among rural villagers. By December 1944 ELAS and EAM, its parent organization, had the backing of probably two-thirds of the electorate.

By comparison, other resistance movements paled. In September 1941 a rival organization, the National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Stratos-EDES), led by Napoleon Zervas and other regular army officers who were victims of the 1935 purges, was founded. The EDES was republican and antiroyalist and, like the other noncommunist forces, was regionally based and tended to consist of old-style personalist and clientelist organizations. The EDES, centered in Epirus, was by far the largest of these groups, claiming 30,000 members, followed by the National and Social Liberation (Ethniki Kai Kinoniki Apeleftherosis-EKKA), numbering about 1,000 members. In all, approximately 110,000 Greeks actively fought in the resistance, of whom about 72 percent were associated with the EAM-ELAS.

The resistance took some time to gain momentum with Allied operations in North. From the summer of 1942 the resistance began to take on serious dimensions. Britain, which was the only Allied power of any real significance in the eastern Mediterranean until 1944 when the United States and the Soviet Union began to intervene, tried to impose a unified command on resistance forces under British direction in order to coordinate the guerrilla activity in GreeceAfrica. The destruction of a railroad viaduct at Gorgopotomos in November 1942 was the single most important operation of the resistance and also the only time ELAS cooperated with other resistance movements under a single command.

The British Military Mission complained that much of the energy of resistance groups was directed not against the Axis forces but against each other and that their efforts at coordination were largely futile. The internal rivalries were dramatically shown after the Italian surrender in 1943. The EAM-ELAS miscalculated that German forces would be immediately withdrawn from Greece, leaving the way open for a revolutionary offensive. Collecting a windfall in Italian arms and munitions that made it independent of British sources of supply, ELAS conducted a campaign between the summer of 1943 and February 1944 that virtually eliminated some of the noncommunist resistance groups; others survived only after the British, finally alerted to the power and aims of ELAS, intervened to save them. This period has come to be known as the "first round" of the Civil War.

The Greek forces assembled in the Middle East (known as the Middle East Armed Forces-MEAF), meanwhile, suffered from similar internecine conflicts. The old antagonisms dating from the national schism remained of paramount importance within the officer corps. Beginning in 1942 there was some attempt to reinstate the most able republican officers, a move that was bitterly resisted by the largely royalist army and navy. While the officer corps squabbled over old wounds, the rank and file were overwhelming (probably as much as 80 percent) allied with the EAM. The communist position in the enlisted ranks was continually strengthened as news spread of the communist resistance in Greece. Secret extremist organizations of both left and right proliferated, at times destroying the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

Between 1942 and 1944 there were frequent mutinies and strikes (delicately termed "anomalies"), culminating in the "grand revolt" of spring 1944 by republican and communist soldiers and sailors trying to force the recognition of a government of general national unity under the auspices of the EAM's clandestine provisional government, the Political Committee of National Liberation (Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftheroseos-PEEA), set up in March. Only the threat of attack by British forces finally ended the mass mutiny. The British conducted a purge of the Greek forces to root out the communist elements, reducing its size from 15,000 to 3,000. According to recently available evidence, it is almost certain that the EAM-ELAS did not have any direct communication or guidance of the communist groups, although it was generally assumed at the time and for decades after that the troubles in the MEAF had been part of an overall plan for a revolution. The British despaired of the Greek forces' ever becoming combat-ready, given both the unimpressive credentials of most in the bloated officer corps and the chronic politicization of all ranks. In fact, many analysts, believe that the British interference hindered efforts by the more moderate forces to work out an accommodation within the military.

The resistance was from its inception basically antiroyalist, and the restoration of the republic after the war was considered one of its primary goals. Republicans of all stripes, Communists, and even some monarchists pressed the king throughout the war for a pledge that he would not return to Greece until after a postwar plebiscite had been held to decide the fate of the monarchy. George obstinately refused. The British were thoroughly consistent with their long history of intervention in Greek politics and strongly favored the retention of the monarchy as the one stabilizing force in Greek politics. Their principal concern was that the eastern Mediterranean remain both stable and British, considered especially important since the historical Russian challenge to British hegemony in the area seemed to reappear with the rise of the Greek Communist forces (though reliable evidence of Soviet intervention has never been presented). The end of the war was approaching in late 1944, and the Allied powers were already turning their attention to postwar arrangements. The British prime minister, Winston Churchill, went to Moscow to negotiate with Soviet premier Josef Stalin in October and emerged with the "percentages agreement" apportioning spheres of influence in Eastern Europe between the Soviet Union and Britain. Britain was accordingly given a 90-percent controlling interest in Greece, while the Soviet Union reserved only 10 percent. For all intents and purposes, Stalin had washed his hands of Greece. Apparently, the KKE knew nothing of these developments.

The Germans withdrew from Greece in October 1944. Through the Soviet military mission in Athens the KKE was ordered to "avoid opposition" and to participate in the newly arrived coalition government, headed by George Papandreou, a moderate republican. Although the EAM-ELAS had effective control of all of Greece outside the capital, the Communists bowed to Moscow's directive, accepting six relatively unimportant cabinet positions in the British-sanctioned government.

The Second Round: The Athens Uprising, December 1944

The new government faced the enormous problem of caring for a ravaged population and rebuilding a shattered nation. Economic conditions in Greece worsened in 1945, despite the end of fighting. It was estimated that 8 percent of the population-well over half a million out of roughly 7 million-had been killed in the war or died during the occupation. Of a prewar Jewish community of approximately 76,000, over 60,000 had been killed. The only other Allied power that had suffered more during the war was the Soviet Union. The physical destruction was assessed in 1946 at US $8.5 billion, or well over US $1,000 per person. Some 1,500 villages had been destroyed, leaving 700,000 Greeks homeless. Fruit and tobacco crops, strong prewar export items, were destroyed, and food production was half of what it had been in 1940. Communications and transportation networks were in ruins. Two-thirds of the merchant fleet had been sunk, and the harbors remained clogged with mines and sunken ships. Crete, the most important island, was under enemy occupation until the German surrender in May 1945.

Nevertheless, prodded by the British, the new government first turned its attention to demobilizing the resistance groups, particularly ELAS. Plans were made to form a unified national army joining ELAS and the EDES with the MEAF. It was a tense accord, and both Communists and the government were highly suspicious and sensitive to any hint of betrayal. Misunderstandings were responsible for the timing of the uprising, but it is probable that some sort of confrontation was inevitable. The opposing forces were too evenly matched-the KKE apparently realized that the goals of the groups were too antithetical to make for a lasting compromise. In November, in the face of what it considered to be threatening moves by the British, the EAM representatives left the government, and ELAS units refused to surrender their arms to the British commanding officer. On December 3, 1944, a demonstration designed to show the EAM's popular strength in Athens could not be controlled by the British forces which fired into the crowd. Estimates of civilian dead ranged from as few as seven to as many as 28, and the wounded from 12 to over 100. The Battle of Athens, the second round of the Civil War, ensued with Communist and government forces (including British troops) fighting in the streets for control of the capital. The battle lasted for 33 days, and the Communist forces were soundly defeated by a British force strengthened by troops taken from the Italian front to oppose the Communist takeover.

During the fighting the British feared that public opinion was dangerously sympathetic to the Communist revolt and deeply resentful of the government's cooperation with collaborationists from the occupation. They persuaded the king to appeal to a broader audience by appointing as regent the archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, a heroic figure during the occupation and respected by both sides. Papandreou resigned as prime minister, and the regent appointed the Liberal hero, Plastiras, in his place.

Although armed revolution had been openly discussed within the KKE since its inception, the Communists were outmanned and outmaneuvered almost immediately after their initial surprise attack. The Varkiza Agreement, the truce signed on February 12, 1945, was relatively generous to the defeated Communist forces. It guaranteed certain of their political demands, including the right to free expression, trade unions, the lifting of martial law, an amnesty for all participants in the rebellion, a plebiscite on the constitution, and parliamentary elections within a year. ELAS was required to demobilize and surrender its weapons (although in fact it gave up only a portion of its arms cache), which included both small arms and heavily artillery.

The Communists suffered more than a military defeat during the second round. Much of the good will they had earned during the war was destroyed by reports of mass executions and other atrocities that became common knowledge. As many as 11,000 had perished in the month of street fighting, and whole sections of Athens, which had survived the German occupation with few scars, were in ruins. In any case, most Greeks had simply had enough of war and recoiled at the idea of another; so by the beginning of 1945 the initiative had swung toward the noncommunist forces. The KKE's wartime allies in the EAM broke away, and the divisions between republicans and royalists were muted for the sake of a national crusade of anticommunism. By the time of the plebiscite in September 1946 it was clear that the voters had largely disowned the Communists. Ninety-four percent of eligible voters turned out, and two-thirds voted in favor of the monarchy, the most visible target of the Communist attacks; the results were the exact obverse of allegiances during the resistance.

The Third Round

It is difficult to put an exact date on the resumption of fighting. Sporadic and unorganized clashes occurred throughout 1945, but incidents increased in the late summer and fall. The Communists charged that a "White Terror" was being waged by Metaxists and former collaborators and that the remnants of the wartime Security Battalions formed the core of the vigilante bands. The evidence seems to bear out their accusations, and some analysts suggest that until the spring of 1947 there was, in some areas of Greece, a virtual parallel state of fanatical anticommunists. While former members of the resistance were systematically purged from the civil service, no similar efforts were made to root out collaborators. The police were apparently hesitant to investigate charges of crimes by known right-wingers, while zealously pursuing left-wing activists. Metaxists controlled much of the judicial system, and there seem to have been marked discrepancies in the sentences meted out, depending on the ideological affiliations of the accused. The Communists engaged in a terror of their own, but to a much lesser extent.

The government's decision to reverse the schedule agreed to at Varkiza and hold parliamentary elections before holding a plebiscite on the monarchy was considered a provocation by the KKE, which called for a boycott by its supporters. As the March 1946 election approached, violence increased, and the country began a gradual slide back into civil war. The KKE had lost much of its popular support, but its former supporters did not swing to the right either. In the election only 49 percent of the electorate turned out-a remarkably low rate for Greece-and of that only 65 percent voted for right-wing candidates. The Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Elections estimated that the politically motivated, i.e., communist sympathizer, abstention rate did not exceed 9.4 percent. In effect, despite widespread fraud, the right wing won less than one-third of the vote. Unfortunately, there was no center available to fill the vacuum and reconstruct the political equilibrium. The traditional pre-Metaxist parties (primarily the Liberals and the Populists) had been all but destroyed under the dictatorship since they could no longer deliver to their clientelist networks. Many of the former leaders had been sullied by rumors of collaboration or by the events in the Middle East. The Greeks political scene, polarized between two ideological extremes, convulsed in a brutal civil war for the next three years.

Tradition places the decision by the KKE to start an all-out civil war on February 12, 1946, but the party leadership almost certainly remained divided and confused until well into 1946. Markos Vafiades was sent to the mountains in August 1946 to bring together the scattered guerrilla bands, and in December the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) was created as the successor of ELAS. Action centered in the north, especially in Macedonia and Thrace, where the mountainous terrain was best suited for guerrilla warfare. The communist forces, which never numbered more that 28,000, were overwhelmingly outmanned by the combined National Army and Gendarmerie (the national police force), totaling about 265,000 troops and eventually armed and trained by the United States. To partially offset the disadvantage, the DAG received substantial military aid and advice from the communist regimes in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania-though apparently none directly from the Soviet Union-and in the first year had an advantage in morale, tactics, terrain and, to some extent, talent. The National Army insisted on waging a static defense that was inappropriate against a guerrilla adversary, and the leadership was often inadequate. Within seven months the DAG claimed to dominate three-quarters of Greece, and the National Army, despite its size advantage, was in disarray.

In December 1947 the KKE announced the formation of the Provisional Democratic Government, prompting the government in Athens to impose martial law and outlaw the KKE. During the Civil War a series of "paraconstitutional" texts were adopted, severely limiting most civil liberties and mandating extremely harsh penalties (including death) for actions against the prevailing social and political order and against the country's integrity. Many of the provisions remained in force after 1949, some until 1975.

The Greek government found itself increasingly pressed by the revolt, and the British, themselves recovering from the war, by 1947 could no longer provide the kind of assistance necessary to forestall a takeover. In March the Truman Doctrine was announced and included Greece within the perimeter of territory considered vital to American national interests. From that point the Greek Civil War was seen by the United States as a critical battlefield in the worldwide struggle against Soviet expansionism. Between 1947 and 1951 United States military and economic aid (through the Marshall Plan) totaled over US $1.5 billion. The massive infusion of funds and military advisers turned the tide in the war. Time was no longer on the side of the Communists, and the DAG changed its tactics. Thus far they had been rather successful using hit-and-run tactics devised by Vafiades, the DAG's commander. From late July, however, Nikos Zakhariades, the head of the KKE, joined the army in the mountains and insisted on more conventional warfare. The KKE was then mortally wounded when Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, eager to improve relations with the West after his break with the Soviet Union, closed his country's borders to the Greek guerrillas in July 1949. Yugoslavia, along with Albania, had provided both arms and, most important, sanctuaries for the DAG. The KKE had truly been abandoned, and morale plummeted.

The National Army's final offensive came in August 1949, and the last Communist stronghold in the mountains fell on the last day of the month. On top of the damage from World War II, Greece had lost another 80,000; countless more were wounded. The bitterness and violence of the conflict reached appalling proportions; atrocities were common to both sides. The final year of the war was particularly brutal. As the DAG became more desperate, they forcibly recruited fighters in the mountains, practically evacuating entire villages, including young women. At the same time, they rounded up approximately 28,000 children (pedomasoma) and forcibly evacuated them to various parts of Eastern Europe to be raised as communists. In all, about 700,000 refugees, almost 10 percent of the population, were homeless. The nine years of war wrecked havoc on the economy and on the society. That experience still reverberated in Greek politics into the 1970s.

Source: Countries of the World, January 1, 1991

[gi-rene]

Some good info, I wonder if I can glean more on Greek Partisans... we are having a greece invasion re-enactment and because of my lack of an early war German impression me and the guys in my unit are going as Greek Partisans... should be interesting...