Bloody Peleiliu

[Panzermacher]

Date September 15, 1944 – November 25, 1944
Location Peleliu, Palau Islands
Result American victory
Belligerents
United States vs Empire of Japan
Commanders
William H. Rupertus
Japanese Kunio Nakagawa

US Strength
1st Marine Division
81st Infantry Division

Japanese forces Approximately 11,000 men

US Casualties and losses
2,336 killed,
8,450 wounded

Japanese Losses
10,695 killed,
202 captured


The Battle of Peleliu, codenamed Operation Stalemate, was fought between the United States and Japan in the Pacific Theater of World War II, taking place between September 15 and November 25, 1944. The U.S. Forces, consisting of the 1st Marine Division and the Army's 81st Infantry Division, fought to capture an airstrip on the small coral island. U.S. Commander William Rupertus predicted that the island would be secured within three days, but due to Japan's well-crafted fortifications and stiff resistance, the battle lasted for over two months. The battle remains one of the war's most controversial, due to its questionable strategic value and high death toll. When considering the number of men involved, Peleliu had the highest casualty rate of any battle in the Pacific War.





A 1st Marine Division litter team moving under fire on Peleliu-September 1944. Their dungarees are soaked with sweat in the brutal heat & their faces show the strain of combat. USMC Photo


Peleliu Island... African-American Marines move through the trenches on the beach during the battle." September 15, 1944. Fitzgerald. 127-N-9527.

Honors and recognitions

The nation's highest award: The Medal of Honor was presented to eight Marines in the fight for Peleliu, five of whom were decorated posthumously (indicated by *):

* *Corporal Lewis K. Bausell, 1st Battalion 5th Marines (1/5)
* Private First Class Arthur J. Jackson, 3rd Battalion 7th Marines (3/7)
* *Private First Class Richard E. Kraus, 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
* *Private First Class John D. New, 2nd Battalion 7th Marines (2/7)
* *Private First Class Wesley Phelps, 3rd Battalion 7th Marines (3/7)
* Captain Everett P. Pope, USMC, 1st Battalion 1st Marines (1/1)
* *Private First Class Charles H. Roan, 2nd Battalion 7th Marines (2/7)
* First Lieutenant Carlton R. Rouh, 1st Battalion 5th Marines (1/5)


By the summer of 1944, victories in the Southwest and Central Pacific had brought the war even closer to Japan, with American bombers able to strike at the Japanese homeland. But there was disagreement by the U.S. Joint Chiefs over two proposed strategies to crush the Japanese Empire. One strategy proposed by General Douglas MacArthur called for the recapture of the Philippines, followed by the capture of Okinawa for an attack at the Japanese mainland. From there, the eventual invasion of Japan would come. Admiral Chester Nimitz, on the other hand, favored a more direct strategy of bypassing the Philippines, but seizing Okinawa and Formosa as staging areas an attack on the Chinese mainland as well as the future invasion of Japan's southernmost islands.

As for Peleliu, both commanders' strategies included the invasion of this island, but for different reasons, and the 1st Marine Division had already been chosen to make the assault. To settle this dispute, President Franklin D. Roosevelt traveled to Pearl Harbor to personally meet both commanders and hear their respective arguments. After a review of both positions, MacArthur's strategy was chosen. However, before MacArthur could retake the Philippines, the Palau Islands, Peleliu and Angaur specifically, were thought to be necessary for neutralization and building an airfield to protect his right flank. The necessity of the battle was called into question even before the battle commenced, and was later considered to be entirely unnecessary.

Preparations

Japanese

By the summer of 1944, the Palau Islands were occupied by approximately 30,000 Japanese troops, with around 11,000 men on Peleliu, made up of the 14th Infantry Division, and Korean and Okinawan laborers. Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, commander of the Division's 2nd Regiment, led the preparations for the island's defense. After their losses in the Solomons, Gilberts, Marshalls and Marianas, the Imperial Army put together an anti-amphibious research team to form a new island defense strategy. They chose to abandon their early beach-based perimeter defense tactics and reckless Banzai attacks. Their new strategy was to only disrupt the landings, form a "honeycomb" system of fortified positions inland, replace the fruitless banzai attacks with coordinated counterattacks, with the intent of bleeding out the Americans in a bloody, drawn-out war of attrition. Nakagawa concentrated his defenses inland, using the rough terrain to his advantage, constructing a system of heavily fortified bunkers, caves and underground positions.

The majority of Nakagawa's defenses were based at Peleliu's highest point, Umurbrogol mountain, a collection of hills and steep ridges. Located at the center of Peleliu, Umurbrogol oversaw a large portion of the island, including the crucial airfield. The Umurbrogol contained some 500 limestone caves, connected by tunnels. Many were former mining caverns that were militarized into defense positions. Engineers added sliding steel armor doors with multiple openings to equip both artillery and machine guns. The Japanese dug and blasted other positions of varying sizes throughout Umurbrogol, armed with 81mm and 150mm mortars, and 20mm machine guns, and backed by a light tank unit and an anti-aircraft detachment. The Japanese cave entrances were built slanted, to defend against grenade and flamethrower attacks. These caves and bunkers were connected through a vast system spread throughout central Peleliu, allowing the Japanese to evacuate and reoccupy the positions when needed.

On the beaches, the Japanese again used terrain to their advantage. The northern end of the landing beaches faced a 30-foot ridge, later known to the Americans simply as "The Point". Holes were blasted into the ridge to accommodate a 47mm gun, and six 20mm machine cannons. The positions were then sealed shut, leaving just a small firing slit with which to assault the beaches. Similar positions were crafted along the two mile stretch of landing beaches. The Japanese covered the beaches with thousands of obstacles for the landing craft, mainly mines and a large number of heavy shells, buried with the fuses exposed to explode upon being run over. A battalion was placed along the beach to defend against the landing, however, the defenses on the beach were meant to simply delay the American advance, eventually leading them inland to be mauled along the fortified ridges and hills.

American

Unlike the Japanese, who drastically altered their tactics for the upcoming battle, the American's invasion plan was practically unaltered from their previous amphibious landings throughout the Pacific. They chose to land on the southwest beaches, due to its proximity to the airfield on South Peleliu. The 1st Marine Regiment, under Chesty Puller, was to land on the northern end of the beaches, the 5th Marine Regiment, under Harold "Bucky" Harris, would land in the center, and the 7th Marine Regiment, under Herman Hanneken, would land at the southern end. The plan was for the 1st and 7th Regiments to push inland, guarding the 5th Regiment's left and right flank, allowing them to capture the airfield located directly to the center of the landing beaches. The 5th Marines were to push to the eastern shore, cutting the island in half. The 1st Marines would push north into the Umurbrogol, while the 7th Marines would clear the southern end of the island. Only one battalion was left behind in reserve, with the 81st Infantry available for support from Angaur, just south of Peleliu.

On September 4, the Marines shipped off from their station on Pavuvu, just north of Guadalcanal, a 2,100 mile trip across the Pacific to Peleliu. The Navy's Underwater Demolition Team went to work clearing the beaches of its obstacles, while the Navy began their pre-invasion bombardment of Peleliu on September 12. The tiny island, only six square miles in size, was bombarded for three straight days by Navy battleships and cruisers, with around 1400 tons of ammunition dropped on the island on D-Day. The Americans believed the bombardment to be successful, as Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf claimed that the Navy had run out of targets. In reality, the majority of the Japanese positions were completely unharmed. Even the battalion left to defend the beaches were virtually unscathed. During the assault, the island's defenders used unusual firing discipline to avoid giving away their positions. The assault managed only to destroy Japan's aircraft on the island, as well as the buildings surrounding the airfield. The Japanese remained in their fortified positions, ready to attack the troops soon to be landing.

The Battle

Landing


The Marines landed at 0832 on September 15, the 1st Marines to the north on "White Beach", and the 5th and 7th Marines to the center and south on "Orange Beach". As the landing craft approached the beaches, the Japanese opened the steel doors guarding their positions and let loose with heavy artillery fire. The positions on the coral promontories guarding each flank punished the Marines with 47mm antiboat guns and 20mm machine guns. By 0930, the Japanese had wiped out 60 LVT's and DUKW's.

The 1st Marines were quickly bogged down by heavy fire from "The Point". Commander Chesty Puller narrowly escaped death when a high velocity shell landed a direct hit on his LVT. His entire communications section had been wiped out on its way to the beach by an identical hit from a 47mm. The 7th Marines to the south faced similar problems with gun emplacements on their flank. Many of their LVT's were knocked out in their approach, leaving their occupants to wade ashore through the coral reef.

The 5th Marines made the most progress on D-Day, due to their distance from the heavy gun emplacements guarding the left and right flanks. They pushed forward toward the airfield, but were met with Nakagawa's first counterattack. His armored tank company raced across the airfield to push the Marines back, but were soon assaulted by every available tank, howitzer, Naval gun and dive bomber. Nakagawa's inefficient tanks were quickly wiped out, along with its accompanying infantrymen.

At the end of D-Day, the Americans held their two mile stretch of landing beaches, but little else. Their biggest push in the south managed to move a mile inland, but the 1st Marines to the north made very little progress due to the relentless attacks from The Point. The Marines had suffered 1,100 casualties on D-Day, with around 200 dead, and 900 wounded. Rupertus had believed the Japanese would quickly crumble since their perimeter had been broken, still unaware of their enemy's sudden change of tactics.

The airfield


On D+1, the 5th Marines moved to capture the airfield and push toward the eastern shore. They quickly raced across the airfield under heavy artillery fire, suffering heavy casualties in the process. After capturing the airfield, they rapidly advanced to the eastern end of Peleliu, leaving the island's southern defenders to be wiped out by the 7th Marines. This area was hotly contested by the Japanese, who still occupied numerous pillboxes. Temperatures remained around 115 degrees, and the Marines soon suffered high casualties from heat exhaustion. Further complicating their situation, the Marines' only available water supply was contaminated with oil. Still, by September 23, the 5th and 7th Marines accomplished their objectives, holding the airfield and the southern portion of the island.

Having quickly captured the airfield, the U.S. Forces put it to use as early as September 18. "Grasshoppers" from the VMO-1 soon began aerial spotting missions for Marine artillery and Naval gunfire. On September 26, the Corsairs of the VMF-114 landed on the airstrip. The Corsairs began dive-bombing missions across Peleliu, and also brought two more useful weapons to the fight against Japanese fortifications. Corsairs dropped rockets to blow open cave entrances for the infantrymen, and also delivered napalm attacks, only the second time the weapon had been used in the Pacific. The napalm proved useful, burning away vegetation hiding spider holes, and killing their occupants.

The Point

The fortress atop The Point continued to cause heavy casualties across the landing beaches. Puller ordered Captain George Hunt, commander of K Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, to capture the position. He approached The Point short on supplies, having lost most of his machine guns while approaching the beaches. One of Hunt's platoon's was pinned down for nearly an entire day in a vulnerable position between another fortification. The rest of his company was also in extreme danger after the Japanese cut a hole in their line, leaving his right flank cut off. Soon, a rifle platoon began knocking out each gun position, one by one. Using smoke grenades for cover, they swept through each hole, destroying the positions with rifle grenades. After knocking out the six machine gun positions, the Marines faced the 47mm gun cave. The company's Lieutenant blinded the gunner with a smoke grenade, allowing a Corporal to throw a grenade through the cave's aperture. The grenade detonated the 47mm's shells, forcing the cave's occupants out, where they were all shot down.

K Company had captured The Point, but Nakagawa sent counterattack after counterattack to recapture the valuable piece of terrain. The next thirty hours saw four major counterattacks against a sole company, critically low on supplies and out of water. The Marines soon had to resort to hand-to-hand combat to fend off the Japanese attackers. By the time reinforcements arrived, the company had been reduced to 18 men, suffering 157 casualties during the battle for The Point.

Ngesebus Island

The 5th Marines, after having secured the airfield, were sent to capture Ngesebus Island, just north of Peleliu. Ngesebus was occupied by many Japanese artillery positions, and was the site of an airfield still under construction. The tiny island was connected to Peleliu by a small causeway, but 5th Marines commander Bucky Harris opted instead to make a shore-to-shore amphibious landing, predicting the causeway to be an obvious target for the island's defenders. Harris coordinated a pre-landing bombardment of the island on September 28, carried out by Army 15mm guns, Naval gunfire, howitzers from the 11th Marines, strafing runs from the VMF-114, and 75mm fire from the approaching LVT's. Unlike the Navy's bombardment of Peleliu, Harris' assault on Ngesebus was highly successful, neutralizing the majority of the Japanese defenders. The Marines still faced opposition in the ridges and caves, but the island quickly fell, with minimal casualties for the 5th Marines. They had suffered only 15 killed and 33 wounded, and inflicted 470 casualties on the Japanese.

Bloody Nose Ridge


After capturing The Point, the 1st Marines moved north into the Umurbrogol pocket, named "Bloody Nose Ridge" by the Marines. Puller led his men in numerous assaults, but every attack was quickly neutralized by the Japanese. The Marines were trapped within the narrow paths between the ridges, with each ridge fortification supporting the other with deadly crossfire. Casualties were mounting at an alarming rate as the 1st Marines slowly advanced through the ridges. The Japanese again showed unusual firing discipline, striking only when they could inflict mass casualties. As casualties mounted, Japanese snipers began to take aim at stretcher bearers, knowing that if two stretcher bearers were injured or killed, more would have to return to replace them, and the snipers could steadily pick off more and more Marines. In place of their banzai attacks, the Japanese would infiltrate the American lines at night to attack the Marines in their foxholes. The Marines built two-man foxholes, so one could sleep while the other kept watch for infiltrators.

One particularly bloody battle on Bloody Nose came when the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, under the command of Major Raymond Davis, attacked Hill 100. Over six days of fighting, the battalion would suffer 71% casualties. Captain Everett Pope and his company penetrated deep into the ridges, leading his remaining 90 men to seize what he thought was Hill 100. It took an entire day of bloody fighting to reach what he thought was the crest of the hill, but ending up being the nose of yet another ridge, occupied by more Japanese defenders. Trapped at the base of the ridge, Pope set up a small defense perimeter, which was attacked relentlessly by the Japanese throughout the night. The men soon ran out of bullets, and had to fight the attackers off with knives and fists, even resorting to throwing coral rock and empty boxes of ammunition at the Japanese. Pope and his men managed to hold out until dawn. When they evacuated the position, only 9 men remained. Pope would receive the Medal of Honor for his actions.


The Japanese eventually inflicted 60% casualties on Puller's 1st Marines, who lost 1749 out of approximately 3000 men. After six days of deadly fighting in the ridges of Umurbrogol, General Roy Geiger, commander of the III Amphibious Corps, sent elements of 81st Infantry Division to Peleliu to relieve the regiment. The 321st Regiment Combat Team landed on the western beaches of Peleliu, at the northern end of Umurbrogol mountain, on September 23. The 321st Regiment, and the 5th and 7th Marines all took their turn attacking the Umurbrogol, and all suffered similar casualties. By mid-October, the 5th and 7th Marines both lost around half their men while clawing their way through the ridges. Geiger then decided to evacuate the entire 1st Marine Division, to be replaced by more 81st troops. The 323rd Regimental Combat Team landed on October 15, and by the third week of October, most all of the Marines had been evacuated back to Pavuvu. The Army troops headed off to battle the remaining Japanese on Bloody Nose Ridge, fighting it out for another month before finally securing the island. At the end Nakagawa proclaimed "Our sword is broken and we have run out of spears". He then burnt his regimental colors and committed suicide. He was posthumously promoted to Lieutenant General for his valor displayed on Peleliu

Aftermath


The reduction of the Japanese pocket around Umurbrogol mountain is considered to be the most difficult fight that the U.S. military encountered in the entire Second World War. The 1st Marine Division was severely mauled by casualties on Peleliu, and it remained out of action until the invasion of Okinawa on April 1, 1945. In total the 1st Division suffered approximately 7000 casualties during their month on Peleliu, while the 81st Infantry Division suffered over 3000 casualties.

The battle was controversial due to its lack of strategic value. The airfield captured on Peleliu was of little use for the attack on the Philippines. The island was never used for a staging operation in subsequent invasions; the Ulithi Atoll, in the Caroline Islands north of the Palaus, was used as a staging base for the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In addition, few news reports were made on the battle. Due to Rupertus' "3 days" prediction, only six reporters bothered coming ashore. The battle was overshadowed by MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the Battle of the Bulge. It was said the only useful aspect of the battle was the experience gained in battling the heavily fortified positions across the island. Japan would use these tactics with even greater success at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, inflicting the worst casualties of the Pacific War on the Marines and soldiers.

On the recommendation of Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., the planned occupation of Yap Island in the Palaus was cancelled. Halsey actually recommended that the landings on Peleliu and Angaur be cancelled, too, and their Marines and soldiers be thrown into Leyte Island instead. But Halsey was overruled by Nimitz.

An Excellent book I have read on this subject with a Gut-Wrenching first hand account, is "With the Old Breed" by Eugene Sledge.
Maps and Battle info from Wikipedia. Pics from various web sources.

[cyberia]

Outstanding post, PM. And sadly, one of the very few photos of black marines in that engagement I've seen.

Any idea what their numbers were on the island?

[Jim O]

Very thorough coverage. It's amazing how tough it was to take these small islands one at a time. The Japanese were obviously a formidable enemy, even still in mid-late 1944.

BTW, I took the liberty of resizing one huge photo. I hope that you don't mind. The original can be seen at http://www.archives.gov/research/afr...s-wwii-101.jpg if anyone wants more detail.

[Jim O]

Originally Posted by cyberia

Outstanding post, PM. And sadly, one of the very few photos of black marines in that engagement I've seen.

Any idea what their numbers were on the island?

One of the few I've seen of Black combatants outside of the Tuskegee Air Group from that era.

[gi-rene]

Hmmm I've seen that photo of the stretcher team IDd as Guadal I wonder which is right?

Good to see Montford point Marines fighting it out too!

[Jim O]

I found the following at CHAPTER 4 WorId War II: The Marine Corps and the Coast Guard.

WorId War II: The Marine Corps and the Coast Guard


The racial policies of both the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard were substantially the same as the Navy policy from which they were derived, but all three differed markedly from each other in their practical application. The differences arose partly from the particular mission and size of these components of the wartime Navy, but they were also governed by the peculiar legal relationship that existed in time of war between the Navy and the other two services.

By law the Marine Corps was a component of the Department of the Navy, its commandant subordinate to the Secretary of the Navy in such matters as manpower and budget and to the Chief of Naval Operations in specified areas of military operations. In the conduct of ordinary business, however, the commandant was independent of the Navy's bureaus, including the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The Marine Corps had its own staff personnel officer, similar to the Army's G-1, and, more important for the development of racial policy, it had a Division of Plans and Policies that was immediately responsible to the commandant for manpower planning. In practical terms, the Marine Corps of World War II was subject to the dictates of the Secretary of the Navy for general policy, and the secretary's 1942 order to enlist Negroes applied equally to the Marine Corps, which had no Negroes in its ranks, and to the Navy, which did. At the same time, the letters and directives of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Naval Personnel implementing the secretary's order did not apply to the corps. In effect, the Navy Department imposed a racial policy on the corps, but left it to the commandant to carry out that policy as he saw fit. These legal distinctions would become more important as the Navy's racial policy evolved in the postwar period.

The Coast Guard's administrative position had early in the war become roughly analogous to that of the Marine Corps. At all times a branch of the armed forces, the Coast Guard was normally a part of the Treasury Department. A statute of 1915, however, provided that during wartime or "whenever the President may so direct" the Coast Guard would operate as part of the Navy, subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy.1 At the direction of the President' the Coast Guard passed to the control of the Secretary of the Navy on 1 November 1941 and so remained until 1 January 1946.2

At first a division under the Chief of Naval Operations, the headquarters of the Coast Guard was later granted considerably more administrative autonomy. In March 1942 Secretary Knox carefully delineated the Navy's control over the Coast Guard, making the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for the operation of those Coast Guard ships, planes, and stations assigned to the naval commands for the "proper conduct of the war," but specifying that assignments be made with "due regard for the needs of the Coast Guard," which must continue to carry out its regular functions. Such duties as providing port security, icebreaking services, and navigational aid remained under the direct control and supervision of the commandant, the local naval district commander exercising only "general military control" of these activities in his area.3 Important to the development of racial policy was the fact that the Coast Guard also retained administrative control of the recruitment, training, and assignment of personnel. Like the Marine Corps, it also had a staff agency for manpower planning, the Commandant's Advisory Board, and one for administration, the Personnel Division, independent of the Navy's bureaus.4 In theory, the Coast Guard's manpower policy, at least in regard to those segments of the service that operated directly under Navy control, had to be compatible with the racial directives of the Navy's Bureau of Naval Personnel. In practice, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, like his colleague in the Marine Corps, was left free to develop his own racial policy in accordance with the general directives of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The First Black Marines

These legal distinctions had no bearing on the Marine Corps' prewar racial policy, which was designed to continue its tradition of excluding Negroes. The views of the commandant, Maj. Gen. Thomas Holcomb, on the subject of race were well known in the Navy. Negroes did not have the "right'' to demand a place in the corps, General Holcomb told the Navy's General Board when that body was considering the expansion of the corps in April 1941. "If it were a question of having a Marine Corps of 5,000 whites or 250,000 Negroes, I would rather have the whites.''5 He was more circumspect but no more reasonable when he explained the racial exclusion publicly. Black enlistment was impractical, he told one civil rights group, because the Marine Corps was too small to form racially separate units.6 And, if some Negroes persisted in trying to volunteer after Pearl Harbor, there was another deterrent, described by at least one senior recruiter: the medical examiner was cautioned to disqualify the black applicant during the enlistment physical. 7

Such evasions could no longer be practiced after President Roosevelt decided to admit Negroes to the general service of the naval establishment. According to Secretary Knox the President wanted the Navy to handle the matter "in a way that would not inject into the whole personnel of the Navy the race question.''8 Under pressure to make some move, General Holcomb proposed the enlistment of 1,000 Negroes in the volunteer Marine Corps Reserve for duty in the general service in a segregated composite defense battalion. The battalion would consist primarily of seacoast and antiaircraft artillery, a rifle company with a light tank platoon, and other weapons units and components necessary to make it a self-sustaining unit. 9 To inject the subject of race "to a less degree than any other known scheme," the commandant planned to train the unit in an isolated camp and assign it to a remote station. 10 The General Board accepted this proposal, explaining to Secretary Knox that Negroes could not be used in the Marine Corps' amphibious units because the inevitable replacement and redistribution of men in combat would "prevent the maintenance of necessary segregation." The board also mentioned that experienced noncommissioned officers were at a premium and that diverting them to train a black unit would be militarily inefficient. 11


Although the enlistment of black marines began on 1 June 1942, the corps placed the reservists on inactive status until a training-size unit could be enlisted and segregated facilities built at Montford Point on the vast training reservation at Marine Barracks, New River (later renamed Camp LeJeune), North Carolina.12 On 26 August the first contingent of Negroes began recruit training as the 51st Composite Defense Battalion at Montford Point under the command of Col. Samuel A. Woods, Jr. The corps had wanted to avoid having to train men as typists, truck drivers, and the like—specialist skills needed in the black composite unit. Instead, the commandant established black quotas for three of the four recruiting divisions, specifying that more than half the recruits qualify in the needed skills.13

The enlistment process proved difficult. The commandant reported that despite predictions of black educators to the contrary the corps had netted only sixty-three black recruits capable of passing the entrance examinations during the first three weeks of recruitment.14 As late as 29 October the Director of Plans and Policies was reporting that only 647 of the scheduled 1,200 men (the final strength figure decided upon for the all-black unit) had been enlisted. He blamed the occupational qualifications for the delay, adding that it was doubtful If even white recruits" could be procured under such strictures. The commandant approved his plan for enlisting Negroes without specific qualifications and Instituting a modified form of specialist training. Black marines would not be sent to specialist schools "unless there is a colored school available," but instead Marine Instructors would be sent to teach in the black camp. 15 In the end many of these first black specialists received their training in nearby Army installations.

Segregation was the common practice in all the services in 1942, as indeed it was throughout much of American society. If this practice appeared somehow more restrictive in the Marine Corps than it did in the other services, it was because of the corps' size and traditions. The illusion of equal treatment and Opportunity could be kept alive in the massive Army and Navy with their myriad units and military occupations; it was much more difficult to preserve in the small and specialized Marine Corps. Given segregation, the Marine Corps was obliged to put its few black marines in its few black units, whose small size limited the variety of occupations and training opportunities.

Yet the size of the corps would undergo considerable change, and on balance it was the Marine Corps' tradition of an all-white service, not its restrictive size, that-proved to be the most significant factor influencing racial policy. Again unlike the Army and Navy, the Marine Corps lacked the practical experience with black recruits that might have countered many of the alarums and prejudices concerning Negroes that circulated within the corps during the war. The importance of this experience factor comes out in the reminiscences of a senior official in the Division of Plans and Policies who looked back on his 1942 experiences:

It just scared us to death when the colored were put on it. I went over to Selective Service and saw Gen. Hershey, and he turned me over to a lieutenant colonel [Campbell C. Johnson]—that was in April—and he was one grand person. I told him, "Eleanor [Mrs. Roosevelt] says we gotta take in Negroes, and we are just scared to death, we've never had any in, we don't know how to handle them, we are afraid of them." He said, "I'll do my best to help you get good ones. I'll get the word around that if you want to die young, join the Marines. So anybody that joins is got to be pretty good!" And it was the truth. We got some awfully good Negroes. 16

Unfortunately for the peace of mind of the Marine Corps' personnel planner, the conception of a carefully limited and isolated black contingent was quickly overtaken by events. The President's decision to abolish volunteer enlistments for the armed forces in December 1942 and the subsequent establishment of a black quota for each component of the naval establishment meant that in the next year some 15,400 more Negroes, 10 percent of all Marine Corps inductees, would be added to the corps. 17 As it turned out the monthly draft calls were never completely filled, and by December 1943 only 9,916 of the scheduled black inductions had been completed, but by the time the corps stopped drafting men in 1946 it had received over 16,000 Negroes through the Selective Service. Including the 3,129 black volunteers, the number of Negroes in the Marine Corps during World War II totaled 19,168, approximately 4 percent of the corps' enlisted men.

The immediate problem of what to do with this sudden influx of Negroes was complicated by the fact that many of the draftees, the product of vastly inferior schooling, were incompetent. Where black volunteers had to pass the corps' rigid entrance requirements, draftees had only to meet the lowest selective service standards. An exact breakdown of black Marine Corps draftees by General Classification Test category is unavailable for the war period. A breakdown of some 15,000 black enlisted men, however, was compiled ten weeks after V-J day and included many of those drafted during the war. Category I represents the most gifted men: 18

Category/Percentage: I/0.11, II/5.14, III/24.08, IV/59.63, V/11.04


If these figures are used as a base, slightly more than 70 percent of all black enlisted men, more than 11,000, scored in the two lowest categories, a meaningless racial statistic in terms of actual numbers because the smaller percentage of the much larger group of white draftees in these categories gave the corps more whites than blacks in groups IV and V. Yet the statistic was important because low-scoring Negroes, unlike the low-scoring whites who could be scattered throughout the corps' units, had to be concentrated in a small number segregated units to the detriment of those units. Conversely, the corps had thousands of Negroes with the mental aptitude to serve in regular combat units and a small but significant number capable of becoming officers. Yet these men were denied the opportunity to serve in combat or as officers because the segregation policy dictated that Negroes could not be assigned to a regular combat unit unless all the billets in that unit as well as all replacements were black—a practical impossibility during World War II.

Segregation, not the draft, forced the Marine Corps to devise new jobs and units to absorb the black inductees. A plan circulated in the Division of Plans and Policies called for more defense battalions, a branch for messmen, and the assignment of large black units to local bases to serve as chauffeurs, messengers clerks, and janitors. Referring to the janitor assignment, one division official admitted that "I don't think we can get away with this type duty."19 In the end the Negroes were not used as chauffeurs, messengers, clerks, and janitors. Instead the corps placed a "maximum practical number" in defense battalions. The number of these units, however, was limited, as Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt, the acting commandant, explained in March 1943, by the number of black noncommissioned officers available. Black noncommissioned officers were necessary, he continued, because in the Army's experience "in nearly all cases to intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel in the same organization" led to "trouble and disorder."20 Demonstrating his own and the Marine Corps' lack of experience with black troops, the acting commandant went on to provide his commanders with some rather dubious advice based on what he perceived as the Army's experience: black units should be commanded by men ''who thoroughly knew their [Negroes'] individual and racial characteristics and temperaments," and Negroes should be assigned to work they preferred.


The points emphasized in General Schmidt's letter to Marine commanders—a rigid insistence on racial separation and a willingness to work for equal treatment of black troops—along with an acknowledgement of the Marine Corps' lack of experience with racial problems were reflected in commandant Holcomb's basic instruction on the subject of Negroes two months later: "All Marines are entitled to the same rights and privileges under Navy Regulations," and black marines could be expected "to conduct themselves with propriety and become a credit to the Marine Corps." General Holcomb was aware of the adverse effect of white noncommissioned officers on black morale, and he wanted them removed from black units as soon as possible. Since the employment of black marines was in itself a "new departure," he wanted to be informed periodically on how Negroes adapted to Marine Corps life, what their off-duty experience was with recreational facilities, and what their attitude was toward other marines.21


These were generally progressive sentiments, evidence of the commandant's desire to provide for the peaceful assimilation and advancement of Negroes in he corps. Unfortunately for his reputation among the civil rights advocates, General Holcomb seemed overly concerned with certain social implications of rank and color. Undeterred by a lack of personal experience with interracial command, he was led in the name of racial harmony to an unpopular conclusion. "It is essential," he told his commanders, "that in no case shall there be colored noncommissioned officers senior to white men in the same unit, and desirable that few, if any be of the same rank."22 He was particularly concerned with the period when white instructors and noncommissioned officers were being phased out of black units. He wanted Negroes up for promotion to corporal transferred, before promotion, out of any unit that contained white corporals.


The Division of Plans and Policies tried to follow these strictures as it set about organizing the new black units. Job preference had already figured in the organization of the new Messman's Branch established in January 1943. At that time Secretary Knox had approved the reconstitution of the corps' all-white Mess Branch as the Commissary Branch and the organization of an all-black Messman's Branch along the lines of the Navy's Steward's Branch.23 In authorizing the new branch, which was quickly redesignated the Steward's Branch to conform to the Navy model, Secretary Knox specified that the members must volunteer for such duty. Yet the corps, under pressure to produce large numbers of stewards in the early months of the war, showed so little faith in the volunteer system that Marine recruiters were urged to induce half of all black recruits to sign on as stewards.24 Original plans called for the assignment of one steward for every six officers, but the lack of volunteers and the needs of the corps quickly caused this estimate to be scaled down.25 By 5 July 1944 the Steward's Branch numbered 1,442 men, roughly 14 percent of the total black strength of the Marine Corps.26 It remained approximately this size for the rest of the war.

The admonition to employ black marines to the maximum extent practical n defense battalions was based on the mobilization planners' belief that each of these battalions, with its varied artillery, infantry, and armor units, would provide close to a thousand black marines with varied assignments in a self-contained, segregated unit. But the realities of the Pacific war and the draft quickly rendered these plans obsolete. As the United States gained the ascendancy, the need for defense battalions rapidly declined, just as the need for special logistical units to move supplies in the forward areas increased. The corps had originally depended on its replacement battalions to move the mountains of supply involved in amphibious assaults, but the constant flow of replacements to battlefield units and the need for men with special logistical skill had led in the middle of the war to the organization of pioneer battalions. To supplement the work of these shore party units and to absorb the rapidly growing number of black draftees, the Division of Plans and Policies eventually created fifty-one separate depot companies and twelve separate ammunition companies manned by Negroes. The majority of these new units served in base and service depots, handling ammunition and hauling supplies, but a significant number of them also served as part of the shore parties attached to the divisional assault units. These units often worked under enemy fire and on occasion joined in the battle as they moved supplies, evacuated the wounded, and secured the operation's supply dumps.27 Nearly 8,000 men, about 40 percent of the corps' black enlistment, served in this sometimes hazardous combat support duty. The experience of these depot and ammunition companies provided the Marine Corps with an interesting irony. In contrast to Negroes in the other services, black marines trained for combat were never so used. Those trained for the humdrum labor tasks, however, found themselves in the thick of the fighting on Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and elsewhere, suffering combat casualties and winning combat citations for their units.

The increased allotment of black troops entering the corps and the commandant's call for replacing all white noncommissioned officers with blacks as quickly as they could be sufficiently trained caused problems for the black combat units. The 51st Defense Battalion in particular suffered many vicissitudes in its training and deployment. The 51st was the first black unit in the Marine Corps, a doubtful advantage considering the frequent reorganization and rapid troop turnover that proved its lot. At first the reception and training of all black inductees fell to the battalion, but in March 1943 a separate Headquarters Company, Recruit Depot Battalion, was organized at Montford Point.28 Its cadre was drawn from the 51st, as were the noncommissioned officers and key personnel of he newly organized ammunition and depot companies and the black security detachments organized at Montford Point and assigned to the Naval Ammunition Depot, McAlester, Oklahoma, and the Philadelphia Depot of Supplies.

In effect, the 51st served as a specialist training school for the black combat units When the second black defense battalion, the 52d, was organized in December 1943 its cadre, too, was drawn from the 51st. By the time the 5 1st was actually deployed, it had been reorganized several times and many of its best men had been siphoned off as leaders for new units. To compound these losses of experienced men, the battalion was constantly receiving large influxes of inexperienced and educationally deficient draftees and sometimes there was infighting among its officers.29

Training for black units only emphasized the rigid segregation enforced in the Marine Corps. After their segregated eight-week recruit training, the men were formed into companies at Montford Point; those assigned to the defense battalion' were sent for specialist training in the weapons and equipment employed in such units, including radar, motor transport, communications, and artillery fire direction. Each of the ammunition companies sent sixty of its men to special ammunition and camouflage schools where they would be promoted to corporal when they completed the course. In contrast to the depot companies and elements of the defense battalions, the ammunition units would have white staff sergeants as ordnance specialists throughout the war. This exception to the rule of black noncommissioned officers for black units was later justified on the grounds that such units required experienced supervisors to emphasize and enforce safety regulations.30 On the whole specialist training was segregated whenever possible even the white instructors were rapidly replaced by blacks.

Before being sent overseas, black units underwent segregated field training although the length of this training varied considerably according to the type of unit. Depot companies, for example, were labor units pure and simple, organized to perform simple tasks, and many of them were sent to the Pacific less than two weeks after activation. In contrast, the 51st Defense Battalion spent two months In hard field training, scarcely enough considering the number of raw recruits, totally unfamiliar with gunnery, that were being fed regularly into what was essentially an artillery battalion.

The experience of the two defense battalions demonstrates that racial considerations governed their eventual deployment just as it had decided their organization. With no further strategic need for defense battalions, the Marine Corps began to dismantle them in 1944, just as the two black units became operational and were about to be sent to the Central and South Pacific. The eighteen white defense battalions were subsequently reorganized as antiaircraft artillery battalions for use with amphibious groups in the forward areas. While the two black units were similarly reorganized, only they and one of the white units retained the title of defense battalion. Their deployment was also different. The policy of self-contained, segregated service was, in the case of a large combat unit, best followed in the rear areas, and the two black battalions were assigned to routine garrison duties in the backwaters of the theater, the 51st at Eniwetok in the Marshalls, the 52d at Guam. The latter unit saw nearly half its combat-trained men detailed to work as stevedores. It was not surprising that the morale in both units suffered. 31


Even more explicitly racial was the warning of a senior combat commander to the effect that the deployment of black depot units to the Polynesian areas of the Pacific should be avoided. The Polynesians, he explained, were delightful people, and their "primitively romantic" women shared their intimate favors with one and all. Mixture with the white race had produced "a very high-class half-caste," mixture with the Chinese a "very desireable type," but the union of black and "Melanesian types… produces a very undesirable citizen." The Marine Corps, Maj. Gen. Charles F. B. Price continued, had a special moral obligation and a selfish interest in protecting the population of American Samoa, especially, from intimacy with Negroes; he strongly urged therefore that any black units deployed to the Pacific should be sent to Micronesia where they "can do no racial harm. " 32

General Price must have been entertaining second thoughts, since five depot companies were already en route to Samoa at his request. Nevertheless, because of the "importance" of his reservations the matter was brought to the attention of the Director of Plans and Policies.33 As a result, the assignment of the 7th and 8th Depot Companies to Samoa proved short-lived. Arriving on 13 October 1943, they were redeployed to the Ellice Islands in the Micronesia group the next day.

Thanks to the operations of the ammunition and depot companies, a large number of black marines, serving in small, efficient labor units, often exposed to enemy foe, made a valuable contribution. That so many black marines participated, at least from time to time, in the fighting may explain in part the fact chat relatively few racial incidents took place in the corps during the war. But if many Negroes served in forward areas, they were all nevertheless severely restricted in opportunity. Black marines were excluded from the corps' celebrated combat divisions and its air arm. They were also excluded from the Women's Reserve, and not until the last months of the war did the corps accept its first black officer candidates. Marine spokesmen justified the latter exclusion on the grounds that the corps lacked facilities—that is, segregated facilities—for training black officers.34

These exclusions did not escape the attention of the civil rights spokesmen who took their demands to Secretary Knox and the White House.35 It was to little avail. With the exception of the officer candidates in 1945, the separation of the races remained absolute, and Negroes continued to be excluded from the main combat units of the Marine Corps.

Personal prejudices aside, the desire for social harmony and the fear of the unknown go far toward explaining the Marine Corps' wartime racial policy. A small, specialized, and racially exclusive organization, the Marine Corps reacted to the directives of the Secretary of the Navy and the necessities of wartime operation with a rigid segregation policy, its black troops restricted to about 4 percent of hits enlisted strength. A large part of this black strength was assigned to labor units where Negroes performed valuable and sometimes dangerous service in the Pacific war. Complaints from civil rights advocates abounded, but neither protests nor the cost to military efficiency of duplicating training facilities were of sufficient moment to overcome the sentiment against significant racial change, which was kept to a minimum. Judged strictly in terms of keeping racial harmony, the corps policy must be considered a success. Ironically this very success prevented any modification of that policy during the war.

[cyberia]

That is some find, Jim. A remarkably sad and thought provoking read.

Originally Posted by Jim O

...the reminiscences of a senior official in the Division of Plans and Policies who looked back on his 1942 experiences:

"It just scared us to death when the colored were put on it. I went over to Selective Service and saw Gen. Hershey, and he turned me over to a lieutenant colonel [Campbell C. Johnson]—that was in April—and he was one grand person. I told him, "Eleanor [Mrs. Roosevelt] says we gotta take in Negroes, and we are just scared to death, we've never had any in, we don't know how to handle them, we are afraid of them."

To think, the United Sates was just attacked at Pearl Harbor by the Japanese and seriously bloodied. Hitler had just declared war and America was facing the then very powerful and threatening Axis alliance.

Yet this is what some Americans feared.


Here's to those you had to fight to fight. Prosit!

[Panzermacher]

I had hoped that Picture would spark some interest. And I see it did! I looked that National Archives and Records Administration sight over real well and it contains a entire section of African Americans who not only fought in the Pacific, but in Europe as well. I knew they were there, but Not to the extent of which the pictures show. Their contributions no doubt helped to turn the tide in both theatres.

Glad you guys like the Thread. And I hope to find some more pics I can post without angering copyright gods!

This was a nightmarish battle fought in the antechamber of hell. My hat is off to all those who endured this fight and all who fell.