What was best Allied PTO strategy?

[Brett]

There have been polls on the A-bomb & Pearl Harbor. How about
the 3rd major controversy of the PTO (at least that I’m aware of).

Was the 2 pronged Allied offensive (thru SW Pacific, i.e. Solomons &
New Guinea;
& Central Pacific, i.e. Gilberts, Marshals, Marianas)
the best strategy?

IMO, it was not -- the best strategy would have been a SW Pacific
ground offensive only. I quote from myself on another thread:

Originally Posted by Brett

... the SW Pacific theater geography favored the Allies. Because it consisted of big islands that the Japanese couldn’t defend completely, Allies could land in lightly defended areas. Then with their superior construction equipment, they could build airfields near their landing grounds.

Meanwhile the Japanese were pretty much confined to existing
airports since they couldn’t build more. In the Central Pacific
by contrast, islands were small enough that it meant most
assaults had to be frontal.

I would argue that the air/navel resources supporting
the Central Pacific offensive would have far better
been used in destroying the Japanese merchant fleet.
(for instance, I have read that 4% of air sorties sunk
16% of the Japanese merchant fleet).

In addition, the B-29s deployed to China had to
be one of the most wasteful Allied op of the war.
If they had been stationed in Australia, mining
the Dutch East Indies (source of Japan’s oil), they
would have made a significant contribution to
destroying the Japanese merchant fleet.

Historically, eventually subs accomplished this,
but IMO the Allies could have strangled Japanese
much quicker without a Central Pacific diversion.

Because Allies could bypass SW Pacific strongholds
easier, I believe that it wouldn’t have required much
more ground troops, even if Japan knew that was
the only axis of advance. (& with deception ops
they still might have kept large forces in the Central
Pacific). These troops could have reinforced the ETO
along with LSTs.

If Japan had packed larger garrisons in the SW Pacific,
it would have meant more casualties to disease,
which I believe already caused most of their deaths
& incapacitations. Bigger garrisons would have
spread epidemics even faster.


In the interest of fairness, I copied another opinion
from another site here:

In reality American plans for the war against Japan had
always revolved around a central Pacific campaign, for very
clear reasons. The southwestern Pacific:

(1) simply did not offer the port facilities necessary to
prosecute what had to be a naval war,

(2) would have meant that most campaigns would have been
prosecuted in the face of Japanese land-based air (as in the
Cape Gloucester campaign), and

(3) would have been fought in enclosed, uncharted waters
that would have helped nullify the American advantage in
naval airpower. In short, the Central Pacific campaign was
savage and bloody, but necessary.

(4) by forcing Japan into what amounted to a two-front
war (not counting the CBI and Chinese theatres, which are
still sorely neglected by writers), the Allies ably used
their overwhelming advantage in physical resources to
nullify the apparent Japanese advantage of interior lines.
The Japanese were like an outclassed boxer, continually
staggered by alternating left-right punches.

The historical fact is that the Army (MacArthur) competed
with the Navy and Marine Corps (Nimitz), to the ultimate
detriment of Japan.

To point 1), I would say this sounds to me like circular
reasoning. We need to seize Central Pacific bases to
base our large fleet. We need a large fleet to seize Central
Pacific bases…

To point 2), I would reiterate the overwhelming Allied
advantage in constructing air bases (meaning dispersed
air vs. Japanese fatal dependence on just a few airports,
that could be knocked out easier).

To point 3), It perhaps true, but an offensive vs. the
enemy merchant fleet could utilize open water just
as much as a Central Pacific offensive.

To point 4), I would argue that an offensive against
the Japanese merchant fleet would be a more effective
2nd front.

[ripley44mag]

Nimitz knows best....... Ripley

[grognard]

Central Pacific only, it would have concentrated forces and gotten MacArthur out of the way.

[Brett]

Hmm, only 3 votes. Guess it isn't a controversial question after all...


So far the comments have addressed COs. But how about if you were
the (non-historical) CIC of the PTO? That is you could relieve any
General or Admiral you wanted, and transfer at will (for instance
Nimitz to the SW Pacific).

It is at least my impression that Nimitz was not responsible for
formulating the Central Pacific strategy, he was just following
orders. In fact, I recall reading that he disagreed with the Central
Pacific advance (which I find hard to believe, but it is such a
surprising claim that I am interested in finding out the truth.
I will try to dig up my notes of which book this was in).

I would still contend the SW Pacific was the best geographic
area to advance in. In addition to the points above, it was
the most direct route to cutting sea lanes from the Dutch
E. Indies. My guess is that most merchant shipping was
concentrated there -- needed for hauling the resources
there.

Other merchant ships I would guess were scattered
supplying far flung garrisons & thus harder to hunt.

Sinking Japanese merchant ships as fast as possible
in my mind was one of the great missed opportunities
of the war.