Was blitzkrieg really that revolutionary?

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by Freightshaker

Blitzkrieg relies on a decentralized command that allows subordinate commanders great leeway in how they accomplish their missions. Most Allied nations were not prepared or willing to give lower ranked soldiers that much responsibility. Germany had been training leaders to use great initiative since the days of Fredrick the Great and many great battles, Tannenburg for one, had been won by the decision, or disobedience as in the example, of a subordinate commander.

France had a larger and more mechanized army than Germany. They also had leaders that supported mobile combined arms operations but manpower and a limp wristed government prevented it's correct use.

Britain followed too closely to Fuller's ideas of massive pure tank units operating as cavalry. Even during the desert battles in 42' they were trying to operate this way. I also feel that some prejudice might be in there that Blitzkrieg was a 'German' idea and that they couldn't copy them because of nationalism.

The US followed German operations closely and identified that they needed to produce a fast, agile tank that could exploit breakthroughs. Otherwise they were stuck in the same thinking mode as the British and many French: The idea that firepower was superior to maneuver. The US did develop a successful firepower doctrine but it would never achieve the same results as the maneuver doctrines of Blitzkrieg and Deep Battle.

Outstanding post Scott! Well thought out and presented.

[MAGNA]

The spectre of troop losses being greater than World War One certainly coloured much of the inter war thinking. Maybe the notion that bombers were going to be so influential was one that gained popularity as many wished it to be the case, even though there was no real evidence that it would. The town flattened in the Spanish civil war by bombing was taken out of all proportion by many analysts for example.

The French reliance on fortresses was another reaction to the horrors of WWI, even though it was known from history that such methods don't work once a breach is made.

Artillery and machine guns were still seen as the main weapons for ground use in the future, even though it had also been shown that armoured vehicles could carry both and could easily outmanoeuvre conventional forces.

The seeds of inaction and negative responses were as much sown politically as by anything else.

Politically, Germany did not suffer these problems.

[Freightshaker]

Originally Posted by cyberia

Outstanding post Scott! Well thought out and presented.

Thank ya! Interwar doctrine and development is my favorite topic.

Originally Posted by MAGNA

Maybe the notion that bombers were going to be so influential was one that gained popularity as many wished it to be the case, even though there was no real evidence that it would. The town flattened in the Spanish civil war by bombing was taken out of all proportion by many analysts for example.

Britian certainly thought bombers would rule supreme. After WW1, Britain discovered that it was much cheaper and faster to quell rebellion in the Dominion by using bombers instead of troops being sent by ship. Once Douhet's theories on airpower and strategic bombing were discovered it gave credence to their thinking and Bomber Command was developed accordingly. The idea that "The bomber would always get through" was quickly squashed after the Spanish Civil War and this was reinforced during the early days of WW2. Bombing would rule supreme in the war, not strategic but rather tactical. The German refinement of dive bombing, which many countries thought pointless, was shown to act as mobile artillery. The shock effect of dive bombing really kicked off a Blitzkreig.

Originally Posted by MAGNA

The French reliance on fortresses was another reaction to the horrors of WWI, even though it was known from history that such methods don't work once a breach is made.

BUT.... fixed fortifications were historically proven to withstand assaults by modern armies. The Maginot Line was assaulted during the French campaign but little headway was made. The Germans were stopped at Kursk and Leniingrad by fixed fortifications and the Allies ran into problems when faced with the dismantled Siegfried Line (Patton at Metz for example). When properly supported and constructed, fixed fortifications could stop a combined arms attack.

Originally Posted by MAGNA

The seeds of inaction and negative responses were as much sown politically as by anything else.

Politically, Germany did not suffer these problems.

France's downfall was brought about as much by it's politicians and high command as it was from the Germans. When the Sedan river was breached, Churchill was notified by the French high command that: "All is lost". This was before a major part of their mechanized forces had even seen combat. Add to this a reluctance (understandably so) to go to war and an appeasement policy towards Hitler. It's little wonder France fell.

On the other hand, consider the iron will of Stalin and how things turned out quite differently on the Eastern Front.

[MAGNA]

Good thoughts Freightshaker. The difference between the French political system and the Soviet was marked. It may be the only strength a dictatorship has??

As for fortresses, yes they held armies up. Proper preparations however would prevail before too long. A lot of the World War II sieges did fail but mainly due to the attacking forces being geared towards mobile warfare. The other thing I didn't think of before was the French artillery. Considered to be the premier arm most tactical and strategic thought went into accommodating it. This stemmed from the time of Napoleon and would also be a part of the reason for the fortress mentality which also makes you the defender by default.

The dive bomber is also a good example of inter service rivalry. Although it was shown to be efficient and decisive as a weapon in most countries well before the war, many such as Britain and France did not adopt it as Army interference made sure the concept was quashed.

[Freightshaker]

Even if the allies had learned early from Blitzkrieg and adapted it to their style of fighting, it is still an offensive doctrine. The Allies weren't willing to act offensively early on. The question is: What if France or Russia had discovered and implemented Elastic Defense first, instead of the Germans? Would France 1940 have a different outcome?

[MAGNA]

Good question. Elastic defence also requires good communication between various arms (radio again) and a clear understanding of doctrine. In other words, similar capabilities to Blitzkreig itself. Maybe one goes hand in hand with the other.

Another aspect of all this is unit independence through training and the allowance for local decision making. As I understand it, the Wermacht was trained in this way down to squad or section level so that even a non commissioned officer could take command of larger units where necessary.

The other thing that made a difference was the squad or section itself. Most tactics involved these units being dependant on each other at platoon level and commanded from further up. They required support at company level as far as reasonable firepower was concerned. Enter the MG 34. The section itself now had the necessary firepower which also happened to be an actual part of the section itself. A big shift as each section became far more capable by itself. My training in the reserves centered around this doctrine where the section's main aim was to get the gun into a position where it could dominate (M60 in this case but not much different if at all). This was a big change from the First World War expectations of many armies which did not have such a mobile and devastating infantry weapon.