Was blitzkrieg really that revolutionary?

[webmill]

I would add that the German Blitzkrieg From 1939 to end of Fall 1942 needs to avoid terrain that was either too mountainous or wooded and which was heavily defended by the enemy. If such areas of forests are encircled by Panzer spearheads in a larger encirclement, such as at Smolensk in the Russian 41 campaign. the forests provided the Russian infantry their best inflitration out and local counterattack backs to cause attrition and lengthen/delay the time of the encircled units complete collapse. The Germans suffered approx 158,000 KIA in Barbarossa by the end of Dec 1941
Forests encourage the encircled enemy infantry to night fight which is , if employed intensly , one of the best ways to successful attrit the far sectors, or discovered by the enemy relatively weaker sectors of a German Panzer spearhead encirclement, in my assessment. And thus the far sectors of a Panzer encirclement need to meet back in clear terrain
I would speculate that because of this, the German mechanized spearheads with supporting Luftwaffe would need to avoid poor weather conditions such a mud and the heavier snow and extreme low temperatures of winter.
Note, in all 1939 to 1942 German Panzer Blitzkrieg success the opposing infantry did not have hand held anti tank weapons that can fire with some minor range and closer distance of the Panzerfaust/bazooka type. There were anti-tank weapons such as the excellent Polish Anti tank rifle with tungston rounds, but it was not numerous, and without tungston rounds thin Schurzen can protect armor and the German tank is not destroyed by an anti rifle, plus the hand held HEAT AT weapons is more easily carried for approach under concealment and works better if the Bazooka shot is on target than an Anti-tank rifle versus and MBT such as a Pz III or StuG III or Pz IV

All German victories in Blitzkrieg had Luftwaffe air superiority, therefore the German Commanders could assume and expect that if large forested and city areas were encircled by the Panzers, the defenders would not recieve Para drop re supply from the defenders own still operating Air Force,particulary during the day, to prolong the resistance and escape infltration out. I would put forward that luftwaffe counterair operations against all enemy airfields, reduces any desperate meaning to be expected sparesly and hasty organized air Night re supply effort--if the enemy happened to be aware and prepeared for emergency night re supply by Air for surrounded units

[Leatchy]

Feel free to shoot me down here, but I feel that the true architect of the 'blitzkrieg' was General Sir John Monash. He was the first general to to successfully combine aircraft, tanks, artillery and infantry in a concentrated shock attack. Lloyd George said after the war that he was the most resourceful General in the whole British Army.

[Geek44]

And feel free to shoot ME down when I ask; Hey didn't the Germans start playing with these tactics in the first war? Getting troops behind the lines under cover of gas, artillery etc.?

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by webmill

I would add that the German Blitzkrieg From 1939 to end of Fall 1942 needs to avoid terrain that was either too mountainous or wooded and which was heavily defended by the enemy.

Depends on the enemy one is facing.

In the second application of Blitzkrieg in 1940, German forces used the heavily forested areas of the Ardennes as their breakthrough point. The French considered the area impassable by any large armored force and thereby left it unfortified and undermanned.

[webmill]

Post deleted

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by webmill

The Germans actual very rapid build up for Mechicanized Forces exploitation, the Blitzkreig phases 2,3 & 4 of the above post, began,of course, after the crossing of the Muese, which was done by assault infantry, after the German assault infantry had cleared the Ardennes.

The Muese was not only crossed by pioneer infantry in the attack, but by armor. Rommel located an unguarded weir which his light tanks were able to cross and establish and armor spear point on the opposite bank.

[Freightshaker]

Originally Posted by MAGNA

I suppose that's why Barbarossa eventually stalled. The shock effect was certainly there but it wasn't quick enough. As you say, the 'initial' shock wasn't enough because of distance (not sustainable as it was in France due to poorer travelling conditions).

The 'tank fright' factor wore off after 1941-42 as well when infantry started to get the guns to be able to deal with armour.

Thus my comments that surprise is essential.

Just like all Prussian wars going back to Fredrick II, a quick war was essential to victory and survival for Germany. Geography played the biggest part in this but the German military has always sought a "quick and lively" war. As WW2 demonstrates, the longer the war drug on, the less effective Blitzkrieg was.

Originally Posted by Geek44

And feel free to shoot ME down when I ask; Hey didn't the Germans start playing with these tactics in the first war? Getting troops behind the lines under cover of gas, artillery etc.?

Yes. Armor, infantry, aircraft, and artillery were all present in the First War, the element that tied them all together was missing: effective wireless radio.

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by Freightshaker

Yes. Armor, infantry, aircraft, and artillery were all present in the First War, the element that tied them all together was missing: effective wireless radio.

Very true, but all were not orchestrated as effectively nor in as great a number (with the exception of artillery) as in World War II.

Further more equipment wise none of the weapons used in the First World War could be considered Bliztkrieg material. A man could walk faster than an A7V and Fokkers were not Stukas by any stretch of the imagination.

Wireless would not have changed that.

[Geek44]

I agree.

[Freightshaker]

Originally Posted by cyberia

Further more equipment wise none of the weapons used in the First World War could be considered Bliztkrieg material. A man could walk faster than an A7V and Fokkers were not Stukas by any stretch of the imagination.

But the ideas and tactics were the same. Break through at a concentrated, small point and expand into the rear areas.