Was blitzkrieg really that revolutionary?

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by webmill

I request an explanation by what you mean by "confusing preparation of attack with attack" I disagree with your assessment here on confusion ,but not your next statement, as it is viable as far as it goes..

My point is that all of what you have said thus far is on the mark as far as a important components of Blitzkrieg. Wireless radio, advanced recon, intense planning and so on were all contributing factors for success.

Recon, planning and organization of communications being mostly preliminary.

The point of the thread, however, is was Blitzkrieg revolutionary? Was it something new to warfare and if so, what was its root success?

Frieghtshaker's view is that all of the above, as well as tactics, were around long before the Second World War. Only wireless radio was new and exploited And he too is correct.

The bone of contention here is what single element made Blitzkrieg different from earlier campaigns and the initial success that it was?

In my opinion it boils down to the speed and shock value that resulted in large groups for opposing forces to simply give up and lay down their arms.

Had these forces dug in, and fought on despite the on sought they faced Blitzkieg would have ground down to a conventional invasion, whereby Germany would have lost a greater number of men over a longer period of time. German public support of the war may have faltered and the perceived myth of Wehrmacht invincibility shattered.

Hitler's steamroller may have bogged down as early as 1940.

History might have changed.

[webmill]

Originally Posted by cyberia

Had these forces dug in, and fought on despite the on sought they faced Blitzkieg would have ground down to a conventional invasion, whereby Germany would have lost a greater number of men over a longer period of time. German public support of the war may have faltered and the perceived myth of Wehrmacht invincibility shattered.

Hitler's steamroller may have bogged down as early as 1940.

History might have changed.

I agree with your assessment here. I have often speculated that during the Battle of France (Fall Gelb) that if the French had dug in all of their 75s and fought each one, the same as Russian determination to fight their 76mm Antitank guns in a "farewell Motherland" version for the French;

The French would have to achieve this attritional standoff by digging in without wireless (radios)dominating their tactical fighting,little used really, and not even in operations, as French units would have to almost decide for themsleves without much radio communication as to where to dig in and start determined resistance this way until the battle begins to change.

The Germans started the war with only 296 Ju-87s; more French and British (and later American)AAA (a What If again scenario) could get increasingly lucky AA shots and bring more down, learning to expect where the STUKAs will attack as the war bogs down and prepared to sacrifice what they cannot AAA defend against the STUKAs and not rout/or panic; Now only the ME-109 stands in the way. And the German Panzer Grenediers who plan and expect to continue on with their tactical victories using the MG-34...and Hitlers gamble to avoid a two front war would not make it.

[Freightshaker]

Originally Posted by cyberia

The deciding factor of Blitzkrieg's success, in my opinion, was the weaponry employed.

Opposing forces that crumbled in those onslaughts were not yelling out "Oh crap, they have radios". They were too busy fleeing Panzers, ducking Stukas and being overwhelmed by fast moving motorized infantry.

In other words, what made the operations so successful was the shock effect these weapons caused.

Large groups of opposing enemy forces, still capable of carrying on the fight, surrendered en mass because they felt they could not stand up to what was being thrown against them.

Originally Posted by MAGNA

That's the absolute crux of the whole concept. Even in the early war period when most german infantry was still on foot it worked. The shock factor came in due to the attacks from all directions. Aircraft from above coupled with armour from various directions - especially the rear - combined to give the impression there was no way out. For the man on the ground it would have looked like a hopeless situation.

Wireless allowed commanders to operate within the command cycle of their opponents. Whatever the enemy did, the Germans were one step ahead of them, which overwhelmed the enemy command.

Radio allowed commanders to direct vastly separated units and have them culminate on a single location. The tools for blitzkrieg where there 20 yrs previous, the ability to control them all was new.

[webmill]

Originally Posted by Freightshaker

The tools for blitzkrieg where there 20 yrs previous, the ability to control them all was new.

While I agree with your contention that wireless communications were essential and therefore critical for the success of the German Blitzkreig:

I question what you mean by the "tools for Blitzkreig where there 20 years previous"...Do you mean the physical truck of WWI was still there for WWII,the Mk I British Tank was there (closer in the French Somua), (and the turret of the Panzer III not important?), WWI artillery pieces basically the same as WWII and their shells? The WWI Biplane, now improved to the monoplane. and ,of course the infantrymans rifle and grenade. Therefore, in your extrapolation the skill adaption of the soldiers to operate the WWII weapons and transports is the same.?

I would disagree with you here,-- in order to successfully stop a German Panzer Blitzkreig, the opposing soldiers need to dig in (and better behind anti tank ditches and mines etc, ); the success of their defense and dig in, and to fight their defending guns, depends on their capability to counteract the higher WWII skill of the Germans operating their much improved weapons and combat Aircraft,(now, this WWII skill is what all combatant soldiers from the major participants of WWII needed to achieve,sometimes in various ways for various reasons, but the Germans had too many battalions and Panzer troops ahead in the Offensive in 1940 and 41)

The defenders need to slow down the Blitzkreig in order to counteract the higher skill of the German Panzer troops and Panzergrenediers in using their weapons at a faster pace of combat. (made possible by improvement in the cross country speed of the Panzers and trucks and halftracks. And coordinated by Radio both tactically for tank units and operationally Also the skill in using the better light machine gun. of WWII Blitzkreig And finally the higher pace or Air warfare in the struggle for Air Superiority.....All of this puts the weapons, communications, speed, and firepower -mainly repeat STUKA divebomber attacks with the 500 lb bomb,,and Air Combat at a higher classification than WWI to point of a difference . Blitzkreig in this sense is not WWI again in the tools. Not at all really. (even though, for example, a weaker slower Panzer I tank makes it seem like not a greatly improved WWII weapon over WWI)

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by Freightshaker

The tools for blitzkrieg where there 20 yrs previous, the ability to control them all was new.

Sorry Scott, bit I completely disagree. There is no comparison between weaponry at the end of the First World War and that at the beginning of the Second.

Some of the designs may have been present in their infancy, but it stops there.

[Freightshaker]

In my first post I said I believed Bitzkrieg to be the marriage of modern equipment to traditional Prussian military knowhow. I agree that the equipment used was modernized from WW1 it's still my point that wireless made it all possible, not some new fangled doctrine or idea.

It could be said that Fredrick the Elder's great 'sleigh ride' in the Great Northern War was the first Blitzkrieg. Same tactics, different equipment.

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by Freightshaker

In my first post I said I believed Bitzkrieg to be the marriage of modern equipment to traditional Prussian military knowhow. I agree that the equipment used was modernized from WW1 it's still my point that wireless made it all possible, not some new fangled doctrine or idea.

It could be said that Fredrick the Elder's great 'sleigh ride' in the Great Northern War was the first Blitzkrieg. Same tactics, different equipment.

Hey, we are on the same page then. I never said the doctrine was any thing new. I supported the new equipment used in a new way.

I give more credit to shock value; and you wireless radio.

I say we agree they were both an important factor and to one day to split a case of Beer and a few choice cigars.

[MAGNA]

I agree both were a necessary factor for Blitzkrieg. The radio to guide forces to weaker positions during ongoing reconnaissance (by plane and armoured car in the forward areas) to allow the shock value of appearing where not expected. I think that is the absis of what has been said in this thread.

From a National pride point of view I agree also with Leatchy that Sir John Monash was one of the first to understand the value of combined arms operations. He was an engineer by trade and knew a lot about logistics. It made sense to him to use every tool available. It would have been ironic if he had faced German troops again in WWII as he was Jewish.

[Freightshaker]

Originally Posted by cyberia

Hey, we are on the same page then. I never said the doctrine was any thing new. I supported the new equipment used in a new way.

I give more credit to shock value; and you wireless radio.

I say we agree they were both an important factor and to one day to split a case of Beer and a few choice cigars.

I like Hefewiesen and Robusto Uppmann's .

[TRDG]

Just a thought, maybe break down each factor as to relative importance to the overall "Blitz", one may be "missing" and "it" still could work, but if other pieces are gone, that might not be the case.....

Cheers, sorry for not being specific yet, I'm not that good , but I'm thinking on this topic!!

Tom