Was blitzkrieg really that revolutionary?

[webmill]

Originally Posted by Tom Houlihan

So rapidity of movement, command and control (in context), weapons, all had no comparison?

yes, in my opinion, this does have some comparison to Cavalry through the ages, but expanding the comparison of the mongols larger to the German Blitzkreig falls short of being useful, in my opinion, beyond these horseman raid comparisons about rapidity of movement etc..

For example, When the Mognol groups of raiding horseman decide to retreat, these Mongols groups need only to retreat generally in the direction of the East, with the Mongol certitude that their Mongol homeland 1,000 of miles to the East was safe from enemy capture by the Europeans or the Europeans of Russia.
To my knowledge the Mongols when retreating where never followed.

Not the situation for the German War Machine and its Blitzkreig, the defeat of the German Army in the field meant that a German retreat would lead to the Allied armed forces overrun of Germany itself and the fall of Berlin

Mongol horseman comparision is limited also because, if a Mongol horseman raider lost his horse, all that needed to be done was to replace the horse for continued mobility;

In a German Offensive a maintanence depot was needed for repair and spare parts of the Panzers and transports of the mechanised columns; and consequently the German Army needed to protect these maintenence depots, and the supply lines to these, as their loss can be a set back

This is my last post on WorldWar II Zone forums as I am going on vacation unless I need to respond to a quote.

[MAGNA]

Originally Posted by webmill

yes, in my opinion, this does have some comparison to Cavalry through the ages, but expanding the comparison of the mongols larger to the German Blitzkreig falls short of being useful, in my opinion, beyond these horseman raid comparisons about rapidity of movement etc..

For example, When the Mognol groups of raiding horseman decide to retreat, these Mongols groups need only to retreat generally in the direction of the East, with the Mongol certitude that their Mongol homeland 1,000 of miles to the East was safe from enemy capture by the Europeans or the Europeans of Russia.
To my knowledge the Mongols when retreating where never followed.

Not the situation for the German War Machine and its Blitzkreig, the defeat of the German Army in the field meant that a German retreat would lead to the Allied armed forces overrun of Germany itself and the fall of Berlin

Mongol horseman comparision is limited also because, if a Mongol horseman raider lost his horse, all that needed to be done was to replace the horse for continued mobility;

In a German Offensive a maintanence depot was needed for repair and spare parts of the Panzers and transports of the mechanised columns; and consequently the German Army needed to protect these maintenence depots, and the supply lines to these, as their loss can be a set back

This is my last post on WorldWar II Zone forums as I am going on vacation unless I need to respond to a quote.

It might be a good idea if you find some literature on the Mongols which explains more. They weren't just raiders although this view is the common one which I also held until I found out more about them.

As far as retreating goes, it is immaterial to Blitzkreig as the name itself suggests. You win quickly or you don't win.

Depot support was essential to all armies through history, whether mechanised or not.

Either way, as far as revolutionary concepts go, Blitzkreig as practised in the Second World War was a culmination of many earlier techniques at practicing the same thing. Through history not only the Mongols achieved success but many others as well.

20th century warfare changed so quickly that even Blitzkreig in the early war form was short lived, negated not just by firepower but by understanding the tactics involved and developing counter measures.

[webmill]

Originally Posted by MAGNA

As far as retreating goes, it is immaterial to Blitzkreig as the name itself suggests. You win quickly or you don't win.

Depot support was essential to all armies through history, whether mechanised or not.

.

Reply to MAGNA:

In the retreat of Mongol forces, I still believe the Mongol comparison to German Blitzkreig falls short of being useful; the consequences for the Mongols not winning quickly, as you say, are greatly different from the consequences of the German Army failing in the Offensive, beginning with a German Blitzkreig, as was the case in Barbarrossa.
For,example, since the Mongol in his ancient era was free of competing in mechanised and radio/RADAR production, the Mongol had no production centers to protect that were of any permanent importance what so ever.Except in the Mongol homeland, as I have mentioned, thousands of miles away.

As far as the comparison of depots go, the Mongol horse was immune to the effects of weather and distance, if the Mongol fed the horse the requirement of hay, for example.

For example, the success of German Blitzkreig offensive method in 1942 the Fall Blue campaign , brought the German Army to Stalingrad. The German Army intended to stay and hold the Volga to protect the newly capture Maikop and Gronzy Oilfields. In the Nov 19 Soviet counterooffensive, the Russian tanks corps met with the 22 Pz Div which due to poor maintainence brought on by weather, distance, and exhaustion in supply could put about only a third of the 22 Pz DIv tanks operationally ready for the Soviet tank assault, while the 22 Pz Div fought well in the first encounter, this division couldn't hold and was destroyed as a result and the Soviet encirclement of Staingrad was not broken.
Successful Blitzkreig prior to this situation needs to keep the depots working so that the German Army can hold territory in the future..

The success of Mongol horseman rapid movement attacks was a flash flood type of warfare. and therefore, unlike the German War Machine situation, to my knowledge, the defending Europeans never destroyed entire divisions of Mongol Horseman and never at one time

Therefore, the German War Machine and its Blitzkreig was not "reinvented" from Mongol horseman operations ; because if the Germans did, nothing would be done or achieved by starting WWII in the first place for the Germans.
Except maybe for the German Army to show off and cause alot of casualties in the world,and temporarily, which was not entirely the case. So I disagree with the original contention by Pirate Draks concerning the Mongols and the German War Machine blitzkreig.

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by webmill

Reply to MAGNA:

In the retreat of Mongol forces, I still believe the Mongol comparison to German Blitzkreig falls short of being useful; the consequences for the Mongols not winning quickly, as you say, are greatly different from the consequences of the German Army failing in the Offensive, beginning with a German Blitzkreig, as was the case in Barbarrossa.
For,example, since the Mongol in his ancient era was free of competing in mechanised and radio/RADAR production, the Mongol had no production centers to protect that were of any permanent importance what so ever.Except in the Mongol homeland, as I have previoulsy said, thousands of miles away.

As far as the comparison of depots go, the Mongol horse was immune to the effects of weather and distance, if the Mongol fed the horse the requirement of hay, for example.

For example, the success of German Blitzkreig offensive method in 1942 the Fall Blue campaign , brought the German Army to Stalingrad. The German Army intended to stay and hold the Volga to protect the newly capture Maikop and Gronzy Oilfields. In the Nov 19 Soviet counterooffensive, the Russian tanks corps met with the 22 Pz Div which due to poor maintainence brought on by weather, distance, and exhaustion in supply could put about only a third of the 22 Pz DIv tanks operationally ready for the Soviet tank assault, while the 22 Pz Div fought well in the first encounter, this division couldn't hold and was destroyed as a result and the Soviet encirclement of Staingrad was not broken.
Successful Blitzkreig prior to this situation needs to keep the depots working so that the German Army can hold territory in the future..

The success of Mongol horseman rapid movement attacks was a flash flood type of warfare. and therefore, unlike the German War Machine situation, to my knowledge, the defending Europeans never destroyed entire divisions of Mongol Horseman and never at one time

Therefore, the German War Machine and its Blitzkreig was not "reinvented" from Mongol horseman operations ; because if the Germans did, nothing would be done or achieved by starting WWII in the first place for the Germans.
Except maybe for the German Army to show off and cause alot of casualties in the world,and temporarily, which was not entirely the case. So I disagree with the original contention by Pirate Draks concerning the Mongols and the German War Machine blitzkreig.

webmill, I suggest you research much of what you have listed above before continuing this debate. References to Blitzkrieg as an initial strike strategy are drifting way off mark, and this thread is becoming bogged down in semantics.

[Pirate-Drakk]

Originally Posted by webmill

In the retreat of Mongol forces, I still believe the Mongol comparison to German Blitzkreig falls short of being useful;

As already pointed out, the Blitzkrieg is an offensive tactic, not a defensive retreating tactic so comparing the two is meaningless.

Originally Posted by webmill

The Mongol had no production centers to protect that were of any permanent importance what so ever. Except in the Mongol homeland, as I have previoulsy said, thousands of miles away.

Just a point of fact. The distance from:
Berlin to Moscow is 1000 miles.
Berlin to Rostov is 1200 miles.
Berlin to Leningrad is 1400 miles.

Originally Posted by webmill

As far as the comparison of depots go, the Mongol horse was immune to the effects of weather and distance, if the Mongol fed the horse the requirement of hay, for example.

It takes about 15 pounds of hay per horse per day. So 10,000 horses need 150,000 pounds of hay per day. That is 75 tons or so. Hay doesn't grow in any quantity in the desert, in the mountains or in the forest. In the winter, it doesn't grow in the plains either. So how do you carry those hay supplies? Oh, and horses drink several gallons of water per day also. Scarce stuff in many areas as well. Also, the 10,000 riders have food requirements as well. Feeding horses and riders is no different from feeding tanks and tankers. Horses get sick too, and require foot care and many other things you may not consider. Logistics was key to the rapid Mongol advance.

Originally Posted by webmill

The success of Mongol horseman rapid movement attacks was a flash flood type of warfare. and therefore, unlike the German War Machine situation, to my knowledge, the defending Europeans never destroyed entire divisions of Mongol Horseman and never at one time

Flash flood sounds like Blitzkrieg to me. Don't forget that the Mongols also conquered China, all of central Asia and Persia as well. The actions in Europe only lasted 3 years of the 200 years of Mongol rule. It is hardly representative of the entire realm of Mongol conquests. Furthermore, the Nazi's were only around 12 years and Germany had only been a country about 75 years by the end of the Nazi's. Not bad for a group of "raiders".

Originally Posted by webmill

Therefore, the German War Machine and its Blitzkreig was not "reinvented" from Mongol horseman operations ; because if the Germans did, nothing would be done or achieved by starting WWII in the first place for the Germans.

What did Germany achieve? The destruction of their government and entire country. Maybe they should have studied their military history a bit harder...

Originally Posted by webmill

So I disagree with the original contention by Pirate Draks concerning the Mongols and the German War Machine blitzkreig.

My original contention was that mobility and communication are the keys to the Blitzkrieg. So I will go to my library and find a great reference I read years ago to quote for you. "The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History" (page 372):

"Communication

We have already noted the extensive use of couriers for long-range communications purposes. Tactical movements were controlled by black and white signal flags under the direction of squadron and regimental commanders. Thus there were no delays caused by poorly written orders or messages. (Probably few of the Mongol commander could read or write.) The signal flags were particularly useful for coordinating the movements of units beyond the range of voice control.

When signal flags could not be seen, either because of darkness or intervening terrain features, the Mongols used flaming arrows."

Gee, just like a radio is used to communicate beyond visual range! Damn those Mongols!
Continuing...

"The Mongols liked to operate in the winter, when their mobility was enhanced by frozen marshes and ice-covered rivers."

Mobility is key to the Mongols. It was their main advantage and they exploited it well.



To understand my point requires a basic understanding of the Mongols as well as the German, history and fighting methods.

[webmill]

Originally Posted by Pirate-Drakk

The key elements required for Blitzkrieg are mobility and communication. Communication facilitates the recon, and control to coordinate the fast paced dynamic battle that ensues.




In my opinion, the Germans "reinvented" the Blitzkrieg in a modern form, from tried and true methods and principles demonstrated by the invincible Mongols in the distant past. A concentration of force, followed by a rapid advance and force dispersion, coupled with professional, mobile troops, using excellent communication abilities to optimize reconnaissance and coordination of the various battle elements.

Reply to Pirate Drak:

I respect and I acknowledge your right to hold this opinion about the Mongols and the German Blitzkreig you have stated in the quote above although I disagree with your conclusion.

However, although I am not convinced the Germans reinvented Blitzkreig from the "tried and true methods and principles demonstrated by the invincible Mongols from the distant past", in your quote above,which I think is a conclusion that is basically unprovable that the Germans actually did this.

My position on the Mongols and the German Blitzkreig is stated and explained in webmill posts #51,#56,#60,#63,#67,#69,#71, and #73 and at this point I will leave it the readers of this WorldWarIIzone forum to decide for themselves as to what to believe.

, good luck to you and the debate was interesting.

[webmill]

Originally Posted by cyberia

webmill, I suggest you research much of what you have listed above before continuing this debate. References to Blitzkrieg as an initial strike strategy are drifting way off mark, and this thread is becoming bogged down in semantics.

Reply to Cyberia:

I would put forward that the Mongol horseman invasion had no breakthrough but instead were always in exploitation. There was no opponent line the Mongol needed to breakthrough except for the different situation of a confined battlefield if any Europeans marched out to confront the Mongols. So the Mongols exploited until they met a battlefield,then they exploited after the battlefield.

This is very different than the German Blitzkrieg here. see post #63

[Freightshaker]

Originally Posted by PanzerBob

Someone metioned the Mongols never really held ground. They solved that problem by leaving nothing behind worth holding.

Actually they assimilated and interbred into any culture they conquered. There was no occupied territory because everyone became Mongol.

[PanzerBob]

Originally Posted by Freightshaker

Actually they assimilated and interbred into any culture they conquered. There was no occupied territory because everyone became Mongol.

No argrument there, I was thinking initially not long term. The initial "holding" was done by fear, once nearly wiped out, those left dared not resist. This no doubt assisted in the assimilation.

[MAGNA]

One more thing that Pirate brought up is worth a look - Logistics.

The failure or success of logistic support to any operation is obvious.

Blitzkreig required almost absolute perfection in this area. Any slowing of the supply line or inability to get specific items up front was deadly to the concept.

Again, communicating needs and having a good, fast supply line comes in here.