Was blitzkrieg really that revolutionary?

[Freightshaker]

Not sure if I'm posting in the correct forum so move it if it belongs somewhere else.

I've always felt that blitzkrieg was the adaptation of traditional Prussian doctrine set to modern technology. Concentration of firepower at a weak point, bypassing strongpoints, and deep penetrations can be found being used by Fredrick the Elder and even earlier in some cases. (I have NO references here in the truck so I'm going from memory, which is aging.) Moltke's actions during the Franco-Prussian war of 1871 and Hindenburg's offensive in 1918 followed the same lines as what Hart and Guderian devised in the inter-war period.

My contention is that wireless radio was the more revolutionary change, rather than Blitzkrieg doctrine. Radio allowed the coordination of dispersed corps and divisions and tactical cooperation at lower levels. Germany was outnumbered by both France and Russia but was still able to be successful against them because of better communications, which allowed them to operate within their opponents command cycle. Neither France nor Russia had fully integrated radio into their military. France was defeated before they could upgrade but Russia was able to use wireless effectively by late 42'/early 43' and that is when their operational effectiveness against Germany began.

I've always found flaws in Blitzkrieg; short term doctrine, surprise is a requirement, unable to deal with urban areas, etc., and I've always been a proponent of Deep Battle so my opinion might be a bit bias . Comments?

[cyberia]

Good one!

First off (and I know you know this Scott but for those who may not) Blitzkrieg was not a German term. The name was of British origin.

Everything you say about the basic tactic is true, pioneered and practiced by Moltke and Hindenburg. And, radio did play an important part in the application of Guderian's and Rommel's tactics.

However, I think saying radio was the revolutionary defining factor detracts from the critical, and revolutionary employment of modern weaponry used in the over all mix and just how these weapons were deployed.

The typical game plan for Blitzkrieg was four stages using each phase for maximum use of objective specific weaponry and units.

In the first phase dive-bombers and airborne units where used ahead of the main wave attack to destroy hard targets, disrupt supply and place combat troops quickly both behind and within enemy positions.

Phase two used armor as a tip of of the spear to pierce deep within the enemy front lines to destroy forces ahead, scatter flanks and use the shock, speed and weight of the initial attack to demoralize opposing forces in other areas.

Armor units were closely followed up by mobile artillery and motorized infantry respectfully.

Phase three is where radio was put to its most effective use, directing predetermined units to break off from the main path of attack and separately engage enemy forces at what ever positions they either held or redeployed to.

In phase four defending army groups were cut off, encircled and pounded not only by mobile artillery able to keep pace with the armor spearhead, but returning dive bombers while fresh infantry units were brought up from the rear.

The success of Blitzkrieg tactics, in my opinion, resulted from superior use of armor and motorized units combined with using aircraft both as winged artillery and a method for rapid troop deployment.

Radio communications were critical, but not as important I feel as the new ways in which new weapons were used.

[Freightshaker]

But none of that coordination would be possible without wireless. Mind you, Guderian is still responsible for radio intergration. He originally was a communications officer and as such he saw the value in wireless. He stipulated that all tanks would have wireless. This was one of the biggest differences in German tanks compared to French and Russian. It allowed virtually obsolete tanks to defeat technically superior models.

[cyberia]

Agreed with all of the above. Plus, German tankers had the best radios hands down.

Radio is still, however, just a piece of the success puzzle.

[Tom Houlihan]

Originally Posted by cyberia

Radio is still, however, just a piece of the success puzzle.

I have to agree with Paul on that one.

They had the tools. They had the tactics. They had the daring and audacity. Then they had the radios to control the whole mess over a wide-ranging battle.

The radios were only part of the overall phenomenon. They could have used the same tactics in 1815, with the same daring, and Mk III horses, but without the control.

All of your factors have to come together properly for the system to work. Speaking of radios, I find myself wondering how things would have gone at a lower level if the Germans had handheld radios in abundance, rather than the Tornister Funk Gerät?

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by Tom Houlihan

...I find myself wondering how things would have gone at a lower level if the Germans had handheld radios in abundance, rather than the Tornister Funk Gerät?

Most likely "Walkie Talkie" type handhelds would have been a great advantage especially at squad level and in urban areas with heavy fighting such as Stalingrad.

Small action groups in tight areas had to rely on either messages or visual signaling for instructions. Prime targets for snipers.

Telephone line layers for forward command posts and runners in such situations had an enormously high casualty rate.

[Geek44]

Guys, just so you know...from an 'ignorant peasant's' perspective this stuff is fascinating. Cheers.

[MAGNA]

The Luftwaffe factor plays a part in this as well. It was the best tactical airforce in the world for it's time (early war) as far as ground attack and support was concerned. The loss of morale in opposition troops due to planes (as well as armour) outweighed the actual physical damage they did most of the time. I think that makes sense ?

[cyberia]

Originally Posted by MAGNA

The Luftwaffe factor plays a part in this as well. It was the best tactical airforce in the world for it's time (early war) as far as ground attack and support was concerned. The loss of morale in opposition troops due to planes (as well as armour) outweighed the actual physical damage they did most of the time. I think that makes sense ?

You hit the nail on the head, Magna. Shock was probably the best weapon Blitzkrieg had.

Panzers in front, Stukas overhead, Fallschirmjager in the rear and long columns of motorized troops pouring in behind them.

The initial shock, however, was just that, initial. In every case the Wehrmacht employed such tactics opposing forces soon over came the stun of it all and would begin to regroup and offer resistance.

It was then that communication, planning and training was used to isolate and deal with these remaining forces, or simply surround them and roll up the big guns.

[MAGNA]

I suppose that's why Barbarossa eventually stalled. The shock effect was certainly there but it wasn't quick enough. As you say, the 'initial' shock wasn't enough because of distance (not sustainable as it was in France due to poorer travelling conditions).

The 'tank fright' factor wore off after 1941-42 as well when infantry started to get the guns to be able to deal with armour.